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 2463 
COMPELLING COMPASSION: NAVIGATING 
FEDERAL COMPASSIONATE RELEASE 
AFTER THE FIRST STEP ACT 
Abstract: Prior to the First Step Act, compassionate release was rarely utilized in 
the federal criminal justice system. Upon the Act’s passage, the federal judiciary 
took a more significant role in assessing motions for compassionate release. The 
number of motions for compassionate release swelled as the COVID-19 pandem-
ic became a major public health crisis in the United States, especially in prisons. 
Many, but not all, federal district courts departed from prior administrative guide-
lines that were not consistent with the statutory language of the First Step Act. 
These differing levels of discretion have created an inconsistent patchwork of 
case law across the federal judiciary. This Note surveys the variety of district 
court rationales for granting or denying motions for compassionate release. Giv-
en the purpose and legislative intent of the First Step Act, this Note argues that 
district courts should continue to exercise broad discretion to determine whether 
compassionate release is appropriate. It also argues that future compassionate re-
lease administrative guidance should allow courts broad discretion on whether to 
grant compassionate release, subject to appellate review. 
INTRODUCTION 
Does a blind man battling late-stage cancer with mere months to live 
sound like someone who belongs in a prison?1 In Kevin Zeich’s case, the fed-
eral Bureau of Prisons (BOP) thought so.2 Zeich’s life expectancy was less 
than half of his remaining prison sentence.3 Zeich and his daughter had worked 
furiously to take advantage of compassionate release, which would allow 
Zeich to live his final days outside of federal prison.4 Zeich’s first three re-
quests for release were denied or went unanswered.5 After months of effort, the 
BOP granted Zeich’s fourth request for release.6 Zeich’s daughter was told to 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See Christie Thompson, Frail, Old and Dying, but Their Only Way Out of Prison Is a Coffin, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 7, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/07/us/prisons-compassionate-release-.
html [https://perma.cc/ZYB2-T4FV] [hereinafter Thompson, Frail, Old and Dying]. 
 2 Id. 
 3 Id. Zeich was serving twenty-seven years for drug-related offenses. Id. At the time of his death, 
while petitioning for release, Zeich had less than three and a half years left of his sentence. Id. 
 4 Id. In addition to his cancer and blindness, Zeich sought early release from prison due to his 
near-complete inability to eat. Id. Zeich was suffering from advanced bile duct cancer. Christie 
Thompson, Old, Sick and Dying in Shackles, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (Mar. 7, 2018), https://www.
themarshallproject.org/2018/03/07/old-sick-and-dying-in-shackles [https://perma.cc/4EGS-SQVL] 
[hereinafter Thompson, Old, Sick and Dying in Shackles]. 
 5 Thompson, Frail, Old and Dying, supra note 1. 
 6 Id. 
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expect her father home the next day.7 But the following morning, Zeich’s 
daughter received another phone call: her father had died.8 
Stories like Zeich’s are appallingly common.9 Compassionate release, 
generally speaking, is the mechanism by which incarcerated persons are re-
leased from prison prior to the end of a sentence.10 The layman’s understand-
ing of compassionate release is mostly accurate; persons granted compassion-
ate release are usually very elderly or severely ill.11 Compassionate release 
helps the government reduce the prison population and avoid the costs of hous-
ing elderly or ill inmates.12 Furthermore, advocates for reform question the 
humanity of leaving elderly or ill inmates to die in jail, especially when they 
present a minimal recidivism risk.13 
                                                                                                                           
 7 Id. 
 8 Id. 
 9 Id. Thompson’s article recounts the stories of several terminally ill and elderly inmates who 
died awaiting compassionate release. Id. In another example, Anthony Bell had one year left on a 
sixteen-year sentence for drug offenses. Id. Doctors informed Bell that he had less than six months to 
live due to lupus and liver failure. Id. Prison officials claimed this diagnosis was inaccurate, and that 
Bell had significantly longer to live. Id. Two days after the denial, which came six months after Bell 
made his request, Bell died in prison. Id. 
 10 See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) (providing that a court can reduce a federal prison sentence for certain 
elderly inmates or inmates who present an “extraordinary and compelling” circumstance). The statuto-
ry language does not use the phrase “compassionate release.” See id. (providing the statutory basis for 
sentence “modification”). Rather, the statutory title is “Modification of an Imposed Term of Impris-
onment.” Id. Therefore, the commonly used term “compassionate release” is technically a “misno-
mer.” United States v. Brooker, 976 F.3d 228, 237 (2d Cir. 2020). Other common terms such as “re-
duction in sentence” and “sentence reduction” refer to the same mechanism. See BOP PROGRAM 
STATEMENT 5050.50, COMPASSIONATE RELEASE/REDUCTION IN SENTENCE: PROCEDURES FOR IM-
PLEMENTATION OF 18 U.S.C. §§ 3582 AND 4205(G), U.S DEP’T OF JUST. 1–2 (2019) [hereinafter BOP 
PROGRAM STATEMENT 5050.50] (noting the interchangeability of several terms that refer to the same 
early release mechanism). 
 11 See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (enabling a court to grant compassionate release to an inmate 
who presents an “extraordinary and compelling [circumstance] . . . or [who] . . . is at least 70 years of 
age, has severed at least 30 years in prison”); U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1 
(U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018) [hereinafter 2018 GUIDELINES MANUAL] (mandating that compassion-
ate release is appropriate for certain medical circumstances, for elderly inmates, for inmates with 
extraordinary family circumstances, or any other circumstance the BOP deems “extraordinary and 
compelling” (emphasis omitted)). 
 12 See OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., THE IMPACT OF AN AGING INMATE 
POPULATION ON THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS 10–11, 41 (2015), https://oig.justice.gov/reports/
2015/e1505.pdf [https://perma.cc/QE4J-JPEQ] [hereinafter DOJ OIG 2015 AGING INMATES MEMO] 
(discussing the costs of housing elderly inmates, such as hiring more medical personnel or requiring 
more frequent supervision of inmates, and suggesting the use of compassionate release to reduce such 
costs); Jalila Jefferson-Bullock, Quelling the Silver Tsunami: Compassionate Release of Elderly Of-
fenders, 79 OHIO ST. L.J. 937, 942 (2018) (discussing the “unsustainable fiscal and social costs” of 
incarcerating elderly offenders).  
 13 See Jefferson-Bullock, supra note 12, at 974 (noting that recidivism risk “drops dramatically” 
from age twenty onward and continues to drop as individuals approach eighty (quoting KIDEUK KIM 
& BRYCE PETERSON, AGING BEHIND BARS: TRENDS AND IMPLICATIONS OF GRAYING PRISONERS IN 
THE FEDERAL PRISON SYSTEM 1, 5 (Apr. 5, 2014), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/
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Following the “tough on crime” politics of the 1980s, the federal prison 
population grew at breakneck speed.14 Longer sentences led to an older prison 
population.15 Despite these conditions, compassionate release was relatively 
rare until 2019.16 Under the compassionate release system that existed until the 
end of 2018, wardens could hold up requests for months by simply refusing or 
neglecting to act on them.17 Between 2013 and 2017, some 266 eligible in-
mates died while their requests collected dust.18 Prison officials’ hesitance to 
grant compassionate release, especially to the ill and elderly, has significant 
consequences for the prison system.19 Many prison facilities are populated well 
                                                                                                                           
33801/413222-Aging-Behind-Bars-Trends-and-Implications-of-Graying-Prisoners-in-the-Federal-
Prison-System.PDF [https://perma.cc/4B46-CHQ2])). 
 14 Statistics, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, https://www.bop.gov/about/statistics/ [https://perma.
cc/H4FR-LZWD] [hereinafter BOP Population Statistics]. The federal prison population increased 
yearly starting in 1980 and did not decrease until 2014. Id. Often, these annual increases were in the 
thousands, with a peak increase of 11,447 persons in 2001. Id. Since Congress passed the Comprehen-
sive Crime Control Act in 1984 through the end of 2019, the federal prison population increased at an 
average rate of 6,199 inmates per year. Id. Despite the intense political focus on criminal justice in the 
1980s, mass incarceration was a pressing issue long before then. See generally Alice Ristroph, An 
Intellectual History of Mass Incarceration, 60 B.C. L. REV. 1949 (2019) (discussing how criminal law 
has historically taken up substantial space in American political discourse, and how this resulted in the 
growth of the scope of criminal law in the United States throughout the twentieth century). 
 15 See Lindsey E. Wylie, Extraordinary and Compelling: The Use of Compassionate Release 
Laws in the United States, 24 PSYCH. PUB. POL’Y & L. 216, 217 (2018) (explaining that longer sen-
tences drove the increase in the average age of the federal prison population). In addition to being 
literally older, prison conditions generally exacerbate health complications such that inmates are con-
sidered “old” at younger ages. Id. To illustrate by example, the health of a fifty-five-year-old member 
of the prison population is roughly equivalent to the health of a sixty-five-year-old member of the 
general population. See id. (providing comparisons of general health outlooks for similarly aged per-
sons in and out of prison); see also Public Hearing on Compassionate Release and Conditions of 
Supervision Before the U.S. Sent’g Comm’n 3 (2016) (statement of Brie Williams, Associate Professor 
of Medicine, UC San Francisco), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/amendment-process/
public-hearings-and-meetings/20160217/williams.pdf [https://perma.cc/65NG-D5Y7] [hereinafter 
Williams, Statement Before U.S. Sentencing Commission] (summarizing the “accelerated aging” phe-
nomenon in prison populations). 
 16 OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS’ 
COMPASSIONATE RELEASE PROGRAM 11 (2013), https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2013/e1306.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/HZ2U-AGM7] [hereinafter DOJ OIG 2013 COMPASSIONATE RELEASE MEMO] (not-
ing the BOP’s mismanagement of the compassionate release program, the lack of expediency in pro-
cessing release requests, the inconsistent standards for evaluating release request across prisons, and 
the lack of resources informing potentially eligible inmates about the program). 
 17 Id. at 27–28. Although BOP policy requires that the BOP “expedite” compassionate release 
requests, the OIG found that some requests took over five months to process, and there was no con-
sistent timeliness standard across facilities to process such requests. Id. The report does not explicitly 
assess why these delays occur, but it notes that BOP staff feel that the individual circumstances under-
lying each requests make uniform timeliness standards impracticable. Id. at 28. 
 18 See Thompson, Frail, Old and Dying, supra note 1 (utilizing BOP data collected by The New 
York Times and The Marshall Project). 
 19 See Wylie, supra note 15, at 217 (recounting a 330% increase in the number of elderly incar-
cerated persons in the federal system between 1994 and 2011, and summarizing factors like chronic 
health conditions which contribute to greater healthcare expenditures in the prison system). 
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over capacity as a result of harsh mandatory minimums and continuously 
shrinking prospects of early release.20 Overcrowding can strain prison re-
sources leading to horrid results, such as months- or years-long wait times for 
basic medical care.21 This problem is only exacerbated by the increased age of 
inmates, as elderly inmates require more costly treatment and day-to-day su-
pervision than younger inmates.22 
Beyond these tangible concerns, incarcerating ill and elderly inmates until 
death serves no legitimate penological purpose.23 Persons granted compassion-
ate release tend to have significantly lower rates of recidivism compared to 
                                                                                                                           
 20 See NATHAN JAMES, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R42937, THE FEDERAL PRISON POPULATION 
BUILDUP: OPTIONS FOR CONGRESS 1 (2016), https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R42937.pdf [https://perma.
cc/XKH9-GYBF] [hereinafter JAMES, THE FEDERAL PRISON POPULATION] (attributing the rise in the 
federal prison population to increasingly harsh federal criminal law and the elimination of federal 
parole); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY, BUREAU OF PRISONS: GROWING INMATE CROWDING NEGA-
TIVELY AFFECTS INMATES, STAFF, AND INFRASTRUCTURE 12–16 (2012), https://www.gao.gov/assets/
gao-12-743.pdf [https://perma.cc/QF2F-V2P9] [hereinafter 2012 GAO REPORT] (finding that prison 
population growth consistently outpaces the growth of the capacity of BOP facilities). 
 21 DOJ OIG 2013 COMPASSIONATE RELEASE MEMO, supra note 16, at 48. In addition to prevent-
ing timely access to medical care, a Government Accountability Office report discussed a number of 
other impacts of overcrowding, such as triple or quadruple bunking, long-term use of temporary beds, 
decreased rehabilitative program participation, and difficulty accommodating inmate visitation. U.S. 
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 20, at 18–21. The 2013 DOJ OIG memo notes that the 
degraded conditions have a profound negative impact on inmate rehabilitation. See DOJ OIG 2013 
COMPASSIONATE RELEASE MEMO, supra note 16, at 48 (noting that rehabilitation outlooks decrease 
when inmates do not have access to comfortable facilities or meaningful participation in rehabilitative 
programs). 
 22 See DOJ OIG 2015 AGING INMATES MEMO, supra note 12, at 10–11 (noting that the cost of 
housing an inmate increases up to $5,000 per year as the inmate ages). In addition to understaffing 
problems, the 2015 DOJ OIG report found that the physical qualities of BOP facilities presented risks 
of harm to aging inmates, as prisons were not designed to accommodate the mobility and lifestyle of 
elderly prisoners. Id. at 23–24. The 2015 DOJ OIG memo also discussed issues with strict compas-
sionate release criteria which only provided compassionate release for inmates aged seventy and 
above. See id. at 41 (discussing specifically how eligibility criteria excluded a large majority of the 
elderly prison population from pursuing compassionate release). The 2013 DOJ OIG memo further 
noted that despite efforts by the BOP to increase access to the efficiency of the compassionate release 
process, the use of compassionate release did not actually increase. Id. at 41–42. 
 23 See generally Grace McCarten, Jail While Frail: Examining Rationales for Incarcerating Ag-
ing and Infirm Criminals, 27 ELDER L.J. 221 (2019) (noting that incarcerating elderly persons fails to 
deter criminal conduct, does not aid in reforming offenders, and serves no preventative or retributive 
role). In criminal law, “deterrence” refers to the process of discouraging certain acts or behaviors 
through punishment. See Deterrence, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining deter-
rence as “the prevention of criminal behavior by fear of punishment”). See generally Paul H. Robin-
son & John M. Darley, The Role of Deterrence in the Formulation of Criminal Law Rules: At Its 
Worst When Doing Its Best, 91 GEO. L.J. 949 (2003) (providing a summary of how deterrence plays a 
role in criminal law by penalizing criminal conduct). “[S]pecific deterrence” pertains to disincentiviz-
ing an individual from engaging in criminal conduct and “general deterrence” aims to disincentivize 
the public at large from engaging in criminal conduct. Deterrence, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, su-
pra. 
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persons released from prison for other reasons.24 Deterrence rationales, there-
fore, do not suffer when granting such release.25 Congress appeared to recog-
nize this when overhauling the compassionate release system with the First 
Step Act.26 In light of these recent major changes to the federal compassionate 
release system and the rapidly increasing use of compassionate release due to 
COVID-19, this Note argues that a more liberal use of compassionate release 
is needed.27 These “forces of law and nature” have presented judges with thou-
sands of compassionate release motions.28 Many judges have granted compas-
sionate release for reasons unheard-of prior to the enactment of the First Step 
Act, such as sentencing inequities, and inmates’ extraordinary rehabilitation 
while incarcerated.29 
Part I of this Note provides a brief history of the federal compassionate 
release system and an overview of how it functions.30 Part II discusses how 
federal courts across the United States have interpreted the First Step Act’s 
                                                                                                                           
 24 See DOJ OIG 2013 COMPASSIONATE RELEASE MEMO, supra note 16, at 49–51 (noting that 
persons granted compassionate release had a 3.5% recidivism rate, versus a 41% recidivism rate for 
the general population of federal inmates). 
 25 See id. (indicating that compassionate release does not impede specific deterrence, as compas-
sionately released offenders are not likely to reoffend). Upon review of the compassionate release 
program, the OIG found that of the 142 inmates who had been released between 2006 and 2011 only 
five were rearrested. DOJ OIG 2013 COMPASSIONATE RELEASE MEMO, supra note 16, at 49–50. 
Thus, the OIG data suggests that compassionate release does not undermine the deterrence of criminal 
conduct. See id. 
 26 See United States v. Brooker, 976 F.3d 228, 234–35 (2d Cir. 2020) (finding that the First Step 
Act indicated congressional intent to increase the use of compassionate release).  
 27 See Nicole Lewis, Byron Miller’s Race Against Time, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (Sept. 19, 2020), 
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/09/19/byron-miller-s-race-against-time [https://perma.cc/
45XR-R5C3] (discussing former Attorney General Bill Barr’s order, issued in response to COVID-19, 
that eligible prisoners be released to home confinement). 
 28 See United States v. Jones, 980 F.3d 1098, 1100–01 (6th Cir. 2020) (discussing how the 
COVID-19 pandemic resulted in a significant increase in the number of compassionate motions filed 
as inmates learned about compassionate release), abrogated by United States v. Navarro, 986 F.3d 
668 (6th Cir. 2021). At the end of 2020, the BOP reported a 21,652 person decrease in the federal 
prison population. BOP Population Statistics, supra note 14. Although the BOP does not report why 
individuals are released, the massive number of compassionate release motions filed and decided in 
2020 suggest that compassionate release played a significant role in this reduction. See id. (showing a 
downward trend in the federal prison population); Jones, 980 F.3d at 1100–01 (discussing the dra-
matic increase in the number of compassionate release motions filed since the First Step Act was 
enacted). 
 29 See Brooker, 976 F.3d at 234–35 (holding that the First Step Act indicates congressional intent 
to broaden compassionate release criteria); see also United States v. Vigneau, 473 F. Supp. 3d 31, 36–
38 (D.R.I. 2020) (finding that an “unusually long sentence” was one of several “‘extraordinary and 
compelling’ reasons” to grant the defendant’s request for compassionate release); United States v. 
Perez, No. 88-10094-1, 2020 WL 1180719, at *3 (D. Kan. Mar. 11, 2020) (discussing how the de-
fendant’s remarkably positive disciplinary record, although not dispositive, weighed heavily in favor 
of granting compassionate release); United States v. Maumau, No. 08-CR-00758-11, 2020 WL 
806121, at *7 (D. Utah Feb. 18, 2020) (granting compassionate release on the grounds that the de-
fendant, if sentenced under a new criminal statutory regime, would face a lighter sentence). 
 30 See infra notes 33–147 and accompanying text.  
2468 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 62:2463 
new compassionate release regime.31 Part III argues that district courts should 
continue to exercise broad discretion to determine the circumstances that justi-
fy compassionate release, and that other branches of government should not 
limit this discretion.32 
I. THE EVOLUTION OF COMPASSIONATE RELEASE  
IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL SYSTEM 
In general, federal courts do not have the power to modify a sentence 
once it is imposed.33 Nevertheless, federal law has always provided mecha-
nisms to reduce sentences.34 The idea of “compassionate release” has existed 
for almost forty years.35 Before compassionate release, federal inmates had 
access to parole that, in combination with “good time” credit, could result in a 
federal defendant serving only one-third of their imposed sentence.36 Between 
                                                                                                                           
 31 See infra notes 148–249 and accompanying text. Compare Brooker, 976 F.3d at 234 (holding 
that the First Step Act allows judges to consider a wider array of “extraordinary and compelling” 
circumstances to grant compassionate release), with United States v. Bryant, 996 F.3d 1243, 1247 
(11th Cir. 2021) (disagreeing with the Second Circuit and holding instead that the First Step Act’s 
procedural changes did not affect substantive criteria for compassionate release). 
 32 See infra notes 250–317 and accompanying text. 
 33 See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(b)–(c) (indicating that the imposition of a sentence in a federal criminal 
proceeding is final except in extraordinary circumstances); Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 819 
(2010) (limiting a district court’s authority to reduce a sentence outside of sentencing guideline rang-
es). 
 34 See Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History of 
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223, 225–26 (1993) (providing a histor-
ical overview of judicial sentencing discretion and statutory parole regimes). Historically, courts had 
nearly unlimited discretion in sentencing matters, “a fact that proponents of mandatory [sentencing] 
guidelines have been reluctant to acknowledge.” Id. at 225. Although Congress curtailed this authority 
throughout the years with statutory constraints on sentencing discretion, incarcerated persons could 
still reasonably expect sentence reductions under the federal parole system. See id. at 226 (discussing 
how incarcerated persons became eligible for parole after serving a part of their sentence and exhibit-
ing good behavior). In addition, “good time” credit could reduce the length of a sentence. Id. “Good 
time” refers to credit removed from an inmate’s sentence in recognition of good behavior while incar-
cerated. Time, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY supra note 23 (11th ed. 2019). Finally, and most rarely, 
the President may grant pardons in especially compelling circumstances. See generally Paul F. Eck-
stein & Mikaela Colby, Presidential Pardon Power: Are There Limits and, if Not, Should There Be?, 
51 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 71 (2019) (discussing the nearly-unlimited presidential pardon power). 
 35 See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1) (providing the statutory basis for compassionate release sentence 
modification); Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 211, 98 Stat. 1837, 1987–99 
(current version at 18 U.S.C. § 3553) (creating the federal early release system which would eventual-
ly become known as compassionate release). 
 36 See Stith & Koh, supra note 34, at 225–27 (providing a brief overview of early release mecha-
nisms in the federal criminal system); see also Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 387, § 1, 36 Stat. 819 (enact-
ing the first federal parole system); Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 145, § 1, 18 Stat. 479–80 (repealed 1984) 
(establishing the ability of federal inmates to receive good time credit). Good time still exists in the 
federal system, but in a different form than when it was first introduced. See 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b) 
(setting forth the system by which persons incarcerated for federal crimes periodically earn credit 
toward a reduction in their sentences for good behavior, but at a lower rate of accrual). 
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the creation of compassionate release and the passage of the First Step Act in 
2018, however, federal prison authorities rarely pursued compassionate re-
lease, and courts rarely granted it.37 
Section A of this Part provides an overview of the historic federal parole 
system, the predecessor to the compassionate release system.38 Section B of 
this Part describes the compassionate release system that supplanted the feder-
al parole system.39 Section C outlines how the First Step Act, enacted in 2018, 
altered the federal compassionate release system and expanded the federal ju-
diciary’s role in determining the outcome of compassionate release motions.40 
A. The Pre-Compassionate Release Parole System 
In the early days of the United States, the federal judiciary exercised near-
unlimited discretion over sentencing matters, constrained only by maximum 
sentences codified in statute.41 During the 1900s, sentence reductions and early 
release for federal inmates came solely in the form of presidential pardons and 
“‘good time’ credit.”42 Starting in 1910, individual parole boards at each feder-
al penitentiary controlled early release.43 In 1930, Congress created a single 
                                                                                                                           
 37 See DOJ OIG 2013 COMPASSIONATE RELEASE MEMO, supra note 16, at 11 (analyzing compas-
sionate release data and finding that the BOP made very little use of compassionate release authority until 
2018); Hearing on Compassionate Release and the Conditions of Supervision Before the U.S. Sent’g 
Comm’n (2016) (statement of Michael E. Horowitz, Inspector General, U.S. Dep’t of Just.), https://
oig.justice.gov/sites/default/files/2019-12/t160217_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/KVQ3-L3UA] (reiterating 
the findings in the 2013 DOJ OIG report in testimony to the Sentencing Commission). 
 38 See infra notes 41–66 and accompanying text. 
 39 See infra notes 67–117 and accompanying text. 
 40 See infra notes 118–147 and accompanying text. 
 41 See Freeman v. United States, 243 F. 353, 357 (9th Cir. 1917) (holding that the imposition of a 
sentence is solely within the discretion of trial courts and not reviewable on appeal). Appellate review 
of federal criminal sentences is almost nonexistent prior to the 1980s. See generally Kevin R. Reitz, 
Sentencing Guideline Systems and Sentence Appeals: A Comparison of Federal and State Experienc-
es, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1441 (1997) (discussing how the appellate courts’ role in sentencing issues has 
grown and shrunk alongside the role of a trial court’s discretion to make sentencing decisions). 
 42 See Eckstein & Colby, supra note 34 (outlining sentence reductions via presidential pardons); 
Stith & Koh, supra note 34, at 225–27 (describing sentence reductions based on “‘good time’ credit”). 
Good time credit formally existed in the American legal system since the late 1800s. See Act of Mar. 
3, 1875, ch. 145, 18 Stat. 479–80 (repealed 1984) (“An act to provide for deductions from the terms of 
sentence of United States prisoners.”). Good time credit effectively reduces a sentence for an incarcer-
ated person if they demonstrate consistent good behavior while imprisoned. See id. (setting out the 
historic good time credit system); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b) (providing the current good time credit 
system). Currently, federal inmates may earn up to 54 days of good time credit per year of their total 
sentence. Id. 
 43 Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 387, 36 Stat. 819–21. This Act gave each parole board wide discre-
tion to determine whether a defendant should be granted parole. Id. at 819. The key consideration was 
whether a potential parolee would reoffend or present a danger to American society at large. See id. 
(mandating a parole board prepare a report on whether a given inmate could “live and remain at liber-
ty without violating the laws”). 
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unified Board of Parole, under the ambit of the Department of Justice.44 Parole 
added uncertain variables to sentencing decisions.45 Federal courts had the 
power to impose a sentence in accordance with statute, but with the option of 
parole, the judicially-imposed sentence essentially became the maximum pos-
sible sentence instead of the definite amount of time a defendant would 
serve.46 After serving one-third of their sentence, a federal inmate became eli-
gible for parole and, if granted, could avoid incarceration for the rest of their 
sentence.47 Congress intended the system as a mechanism to incentivize reha-
bilitation, but some experts questioned the system’s efficacy.48 
Parole boards created a series of problems, one of which was inconsisten-
cy.49 Similarly situated inmates often received different parole decisions be-
cause of the unchecked discretion afforded to parole decision-makers.50 This 
disparity sabotaged incentives to behave well because inmates ultimately saw 
parole as a gamble.51 Moreover, the proverbial parole deck seemed stacked 
                                                                                                                           
 44 See Act of May 13, 1930, ch. 255, § 1, 46 Stat. 272 (establishing the Board of Parole). 
 45 See Project, Parole Release Decisionmaking and the Sentencing Process, 84 YALE L.J. 810, 
820–22 (1975) (discussing the “discretionary judgments of individual decisionmakers” that informed 
parole decisions, and the fact that parole decisions often came with no written explanations of a deci-
sion, which led to unchallenged discretion by parole officials). 
 46 See Stith & Koh, supra note 34, at 227 (explaining that parole made federal prison sentences 
“partially indeterminate”). 
 47 Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 387, § 1, 36 Stat. 819; see Act of May 13, 1930, ch. 255, § 2, 46 Stat. 
272 (transferring powers of historic parole boards to new Board of Parole). In conjunction with good 
time credit, parole could effectively reduce a sentence by two-thirds. Stith & Koh, supra note 34, at 
227. For example, an inmate serving a judicially imposed sentence of fifteen years could earn up to 
five years of good time credit, reducing the time served in prison to ten years. See id. (noting that two-
thirds of a nominal sentence became the maximum sentence a given defendant would serve). The 
same inmate would become eligible for parole after five years. See id. (discussing how inmates be-
came eligible for parole upon the completion of a third of a sentence). Thus, if that inmate were grant-
ed parole at five years, the inmate would serve only one third of their nominal fifteen-year sentence. 
See id. (noting that an inmate could be granted parole after a serving one-third of a nominal sentence, 
regardless of the total sentence imposed). 
 48 Stith & Koh, supra note 34, at 227 (noting the conservative critique that parole is too lenient, 
and the liberal critique that parole is not implemented equitably). See generally Robert Martinson, 
What Works?—Questions and Answers About Prison Reform, 35 PUB. INTEREST 22, 40–41 (1974) 
(collecting studies on the efficacy of parole, which provide differing viewpoints on whether parole 
incentivizes rehabilitation); Michael Vitiello, Reconsidering Rehabilitation, 65 TUL. L. REV. 1011 
(1991) (supporting the use of parole as incentive for rehabilitation because the possibility of reward 
incentivizes good conduct). 
 49 See Stith & Koh, supra note 34, at 227 (discussing criticisms of parole based on “unwarranted 
disparity”—generally manifesting in the form of racial disparities—between similarly situated prison-
ers). 
 50 See id. (discussing the problems that arise in criminal rehabilitation when sentences are incon-
sistent among similar persons, such as reduced incentive to rehabilitate and anxiety among inmates). 
See generally Joseph C. Howard, Racial Discrimination in Sentencing, 59 JUDICATURE 121 (1975) 
(recounting allegations of racial disparity in sentencing that resulted in harsher sentences for Black 
defendants). 
 51 See Stith & Koh, supra note 34, at 227 (stating that inconsistent parole decisions “bred anxie-
ty” among prisoners, who were ultimately unable to determine their chances of being granted parole). 
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against minority inmates.52 The unchecked and unreviewable discretion af-
forded to parole officers exacerbated inequality in the criminal justice sys-
tem.53 Additionally, the parole system created perverse incentives for judges to 
impose extreme sentences.54 Because the parole system could greatly reduce 
the amount of time a defendant served, judges compensated by inflating sen-
tences to ensure adequate time served in prison.55 
Without a meaningful system of review, parole officials were free to ren-
der sentencing and parole decisions as they pleased with little oversight.56 
Courts addressing federal parole cases were limited to discussing issues of 
conflicts of law, procedural concerns, or actionable gross errors in parole 
guideline applications.57 The judiciary needed some guidance, or more precise-
                                                                                                                           
 52 Id. at 227 n.17 (citing Tom Wicker, Judging the Judges, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 1976), https://
www.nytimes.com/1976/02/06/archives/judging-the-judges-in-the-nation.html [https://perma.cc/
JYR4-V39U]); see Howard, supra note 50, at 121–22 (recounting the disproportionate use of the 
death penalty and harsh sentences against Black defendants). 
 53 Stith & Koh, supra note 34, at 228 n.20 (first citing MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SEN-
TENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 5 (1973) [hereinafter FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES] (providing 
an in-depth account of inconsistency in sentencing across the federal judiciary from a former federal 
district judge driven by the statutory capability to impose sentences within wide boundaries); and then 
citing Marvin E. Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (1972) [hereinafter 
Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing] (noting that historic criminal law did not impose a duty on judges 
to “refrain” from imposing vengeful punishments). Judge Marvin E. Frankel, a former federal district 
court judge for the Southern District of New York, described judicial sentencing authority as “almost 
wholly unchecked and sweeping,” which allowed parole officers to make decisions on unfair or dis-
criminatory bases. FRANKEL, supra, at 5; see Zannino v. Arnold, 531 F.2d 687, 690 (3d Cir. 1976) 
(finding that the federal judiciary has limited discretion to review parole board decisions). 
 54 See Project, supra note 45, at 812 (recounting the story of American soldier Eddie Slovik, who 
was executed after a court-martial sentenced him to death, even though members of the court-martial 
believed death was an extreme sentence and that Slovik would eventually be granted leniency). 
 55 See id. (illustrating the phenomenon of “Slovik syndrome”—the artificial inflation of a sen-
tence based on the expectation of future leniency—driving the inflation of sentences). For example, a 
judge might impose a thirty-year sentence, where parole is available after ten years, rather than a fif-
teen-year sentence, where parole is available after only five years. See id. (noting that judges tend to 
account for long-term prospects of early release in sentencing decisions). 
 56 See Zannino, 531 F.2d at 690 (holding that federal parole decisions are not reviewable by 
courts); Criminal Procedure Project, Sentencing, Probation, and Parole, 75 GEO L.J. 1129, 1130–31 
(1987) (discussing the lack of consistency and fairness in the parole system that motivated the creation 
of strict sentencing guidelines). Few, if any, examples of incarcerated persons successfully challeng-
ing sentencing and parole consistency exist. See United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 188–90 
(1979), superseded by statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3624 (explaining that federal parole authorities were the in 
best position to determine when release was appropriate and minimizing the ability of judges to re-
view parole decisions); United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 47 (1978), superseded by statute, 18 
U.S.C. § 3624 (holding that the Parole Commission may order release at almost any time if statutory 
requirements are met). 
 57 See, e.g., U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 392–93 (1980) (outlining a class 
action claim that the government’s application of the Parole Release Guidelines to a class of federal 
inmates); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 490 (1972) (holding that a federal parolee suffered an 
unconstitutional deprivation of freedom when the Board or Parole revoked his parole without an op-
portunity for a hearing or response to the revocation); Garafola v. Wilkinson, 721 F.2d 420, 426 (3d 
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ly, some guidelines, to better ensure consistency and equity across the federal 
criminal system.58 
Congress attempted reform in the 1970s, when it passed the Parole Com-
mission and Reorganization Act of 1976.59 In addition to rebranding the Board 
of Parole as the Parole Commission, the Act authorized the Parole Commission 
to create parole eligibility guidelines.60 These guidelines measured the severity 
of a defendant’s offense against a “salient factor score,” a number that estimat-
ed an inmate’s risk of parole violation and recidivism.61 Several variables de-
termined a salient factor score, such as seriousness of the offense and the of-
fender’s criminal history.62 
Critics were not satisfied with these reforms.63 Throughout the remainder 
of the 1970s and into the 1980s, both houses of Congress hotly debated crimi-
nal justice reform, with each session of Congress leaving another dead bill 
strewn on the partisan battlefield.64 Common to all of the proposed bills were 
                                                                                                                           
Cir. 1983) (concluding that a federal parolee’s conviction under state law constituted a parole viola-
tion). 
 58 See Stith & Koh, supra note 34, at 228 n.20 (citing FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES, supra 
note 53, at 5) (recounting Judge Frankel’s assertion that definitive sentencing guidelines could miti-
gate unfair sentencing practices). 
 59 See Parole Commission and Reorganization Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-233, § 2, 90 Stat. 219, 
219–34 (providing for administrative and substantive reforms to federal parole, such as the creation of 
strict parole guidelines and the establishment of the Parole Commission as an agency under the De-
partment of Justice). 
 60 Id. § 2, 90 Stat. at 220. 
 61 See Parole, Release, Supervision, and Recommitment of Prisoners, Youth Offenders, and Juve-
nile Delinquents, 42 Fed. Reg. 39,808, 39,809–22 (Aug. 5, 1977) (repealed 1984) (providing a “cus-
tomary” amount of time an inmate should serve before release, dependent on the type of crime com-
mitted). Lower salient factor scores equated to higher recidivism risk. See id. (providing that inmates 
with lower salient factor scores must serve more time before becoming eligible for parole).  
 62 Id. Parole regulations promulgated under the Parole Commission and Reorganization Act con-
tained a salient factor worksheet. Id. The worksheet included a checklist indicating how many points 
should be added to someone’s salient factor score based on criteria like recency of the offense. Id. In 
addition, age was considered as a proxy for recidivism risk, as older persons are less likely to reoffend 
than younger inmates. Id. The salient factor score also considered the number of prior offenses, with 
more prior offenses resulting in a lower salient factor score. See id. (providing up to three salient fac-
tor points for inmates with no prior offenses). 
 63 See S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 38 (1983) (“[D]isparaties . . . can be traced directly to the unfettered 
discretion the law confers on those judges and parole authorities.”); Stith & Koh, supra note 34, at 229 
(citing Tom Goldstein, New Studies Insist on the Same Treatment for the Same Crimes: Inequities Com-
mon in Jail Sentences, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 1976), https://www.nytimes.com/1976/12/19/archives/new-
studies-insist-on-the-same-treatment-for-the-same-crimes.html?searchResultPosition=1 [https://perma.
cc/Z2YG-7LMW]) (noting that parole decisions could be arbitrarily motivated by an offender’s char-
acteristics, or by the general ideology of a judge or official rendering the parole decision). 
 64 See Stith & Koh, supra note 34, at 230–68 (emphasizing the intense bipartisan efforts to amend 
the federal criminal code). The political turmoil of developing what eventually became the Compre-
hensive Crime Control Act of 1984 (CCCA) marked the end of an almost two-decades-long effort, 
spearheaded by U.S. Senator Ted Kennedy, to reform the federal criminal code, that is, to rewrite the 
entirety of title eighteen, the portion of federal law covering criminal law. Id.; see 18 U.S.C. §§ 1–
6005. Congress debated at least six separate major criminal reform bills in the 96th, 97th, and 98th 
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two key priorities: the reduction or total elimination of federal parole and the 
creation of definitive sentencing guidelines.65 Soon enough, one bill emerged 
that would finally meet Congress’s exacting demands.66 
B. Compassionate Release in the 1984 Comprehensive  
Crime Control Act: The Crawl 
As “tough on crime” politics became popular during the Reagan Admin-
istration, Congress once again entertained the idea of substantial federal crimi-
nal justice reform.67 Congress’s approach began as an effort to streamline the 
entire federal criminal code—beyond just parole and sentencing law—but 
quickly transformed into a bipartisan push for harsher federal criminal penal-
ties.68 Underlying this discussion was the familiar debate over whether to re-
strict or abolish federal parole.69 
After a protracted political battle, the Comprehensive Crime Control Act 
(CCCA), as its named suggests, significantly revised the whole of the federal 
criminal code, including provisions pertinent to bail, sentencing, asset forfeiture, 
drug offenses, and more.70 The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (SRA) was a 
                                                                                                                           
Congresses before the 98th Congress passed the CCCA. See Stith & Koh, supra note 34, at 225 
(providing a roadmap of criminal justice bills proposed and debated by Congress between 1975 and 
1984). 
 65 See Stith & Koh, supra note 34, at 259–61 (collecting and discussing various pieces of failed 
legislation addressing parole and sentencing guidelines). 
 66 See Comprehensive Crime Control Act, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837, 1976 (1984) (codi-
fied in scattered sections of 18 and 28 U.S.C.) (amending a significant amount of the federal criminal 
code). 
 67 See Stith & Koh, supra note 34, at 258 (discussing growing public concern over crime in the 
1980s); see also Harry A. Chernoff et al., The Politics of Crime, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 527, 532–38 
(1996) (discussing how generally conservative politicians, including President Reagan, successfully 
deployed “tough on crime” and “law and order” political narratives as a means of garnering electoral 
support). 
 68 See Stith & Koh, supra note 34, at 259–61 (recounting that U.S. Senator Ted Kennedy general-
ly spearheaded efforts to reform federal criminal law). Congress’s criminal justice reform goals were 
originally centered around entirely rewriting Title 18 of the United States Code. Id. This goal could 
not withstand the “tough on crime” politics of the 1970s and 1980s that eventually prevailed, which 
are apparent in the harshness of the CCCA. See id. (recounting how, during the Reagan Administra-
tion, Congress considered legislation on harsher penalties for drug offenses and violent crimes, as well 
as provisions to limit defendants’ capability to pursue certain defenses or post-conviction relief). 
 69 See United States ex rel. Forman v. McCall, 776 F.2d 1156, 1169 n.11 (3d Cir. 1985) (Hig-
ginbotham, J., concurring) (citing S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 38) (emphasizing the bipartisan calls to re-
duce or eliminate parole). The Senate passed its version of the CCCA, mainly authored by Senators 
Ted Kennedy, Strom Thurmond, and (then-Senator) Joe Biden in the early months of 1984. Stith & 
Koh, supra note 34, at 260–61. The bill met resistance in the House of Representatives, especially 
from Representative John Conyers Jr. Id. at 262. The House version of the bill would have preserved 
federal parole and did not prescribe strict sentencing guidelines. Id. at 262 n.233 (first citing H.R. 
4827, 98th Cong. (1984), then citing H.R. REP. NO. 98-1017, at 34 (1984)). 
 70 Comprehensive Crime Control Act, 98 Stat. at 1976. The legislation includes several pieces of 
constituent legislation, including the Bail Reform Act, the Armed Career Criminal Act, the Compre-
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constituent piece of legislation within the CCCA that specifically addressed pa-
role and sentence length.71 The CCCA created the United States Sentencing 
Commission (the Sentencing Commission or the Commission) and abolished 
parole.72 Congress intended these two provisions to achieve more consistent sen-
tencing, satisfying the common goal of 1970s conservatives and liberals.73 
The CCCA granted the Sentencing Commission the authority to create 
sentencing guidelines that federal courts must consider when determining an 
appropriate sentence length.74 Using the authority granted by the CCCA, the 
Sentencing Commission promulgated the first United States Sentencing Guide-
lines Manual (Guidelines Manual) in 1987.75 The Sentencing Guidelines set 
forth sentencing ranges, or the range between a minimum and maximum ac-
ceptable sentence, in a two-dimensional table, similar to the parole guidelines 
                                                                                                                           
hensive Forfeiture Act, the Insanity Defense Reform Act, Controlled Substances Penalties Amend-
ments Act, and the Sentencing Reform Act. Id. The bill passed with large majorities in both houses of 
Congress after it was packaged with appropriations (or government funding) legislation. Stith & Koh, 
supra note 34, at 265–66. Up to this point, some Democratic legislators questioned the implementa-
tion of sentencing guidelines, although some Republican legislators felt the bill was not harsh enough. 
Id. Because the final bill was packaged alongside an urgently needed appropriations bill, many legisla-
tors were convinced to vote for the final bill to fund the government. Id. 
 71 See Comprehensive Crime Control Act § 211 (setting forth amendments to federal sentencing 
law, including the establishment of the United States Sentencing Commission to standardize sentenc-
ing and the implementation of harsher penalties for drug-related crimes). 
 72 Id. §§ 211, 217, 233, 98 Stat. 1837, 2017, 2028. The Parole Commission retained limited juris-
diction over persons who committed offenses prior to November 1, 1987. Id. The CCCA intended to 
fully abolish the Parole Commission in 1992 as this group of parolees shrunk, but the Parole Commis-
sion continues to oversee pre-1987 offenders as well as people who violate the D.C. Code or the Uni-
form Code of Military Justice. See, e.g., United States Parole Commission Extension Act of 2018, 
Pub. L. No. 115-274, § 3, 132 Stat. 4160, 4161 (2018) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3551) 
(extending the life of the Parole Commission until November 2021). 
 73 See S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 38 (recounting the bipartisan support for legislative provisions to 
create greater consistency in federal sentencing); see also Comprehensive Crime Control Act §§ 211, 
217, 233 (eliminating parole and establishing the authority for the Sentencing Commission to create 
definitive sentencing ranges, which Congress intended for sentencing consistency and finality). 
 74 Comprehensive Crime Control Act § 217. The Sentencing Commission is comprised of seven 
voting members appointed by the President of the United States and confirmed by the Senate. 28 
U.S.C. § 991. The Commission operates as an independent agency of the judicial branch of the federal 
government. Id. The Commission is bipartisan by mandate, and no more than four Commissioners 
may be members of the same political party. Id. The Commission is also statutorily required to have 
three federal judges as members. Id. The Attorney General of the United States, or someone designat-
ed by the Attorney General, and the chair of the Parole Commission sit on the Sentencing Commis-
sion as nonvoting ex officio members. Id. The Commission cannot conduct certain business, including 
the promulgation of Sentencing Guidelines, without the presence of a quorum of four voting mem-
bers. Id. The Commission’s duties, in addition to promulgating the Sentencing Guidelines, include 
writing policy statements regarding proper application of the Sentencing Guidelines, establishing 
factors for courts to consider in calculating a sentence, and continually collecting relevant data to 
inform future Sentencing Guidelines. See 28 U.S.C. § 994 (setting forth the Commission’s duties). 
 75 See 2018 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 11, at ch. 5, pt. A. (setting forth ranges of sentenc-
es to be imposed for federal crimes). 
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from years earlier.76 Two factors control the sentencing ranges generated by the 
Sentencing Guidelines: the severity of the crime committed and the defend-
ant’s criminal history.77 A more severe crime or a more extensive criminal his-
tory will generate a higher Guidelines range.78 The Guidelines were at first 
mandatory.79 Today, they are advisory, meaning that a judge is not required to 
impose a sentence within a Guideline range if there are good reasons not to do 
so.80 With the Guidelines in hand, sentencing became a straightforward exer-
cise in the federal system and the notion of early release seemed to evaporate 
into thin air.81 
                                                                                                                           
 76 Id.; see Parole, Release, Supervision, and Recommitment of Prisoners, Youth Offenders, and 
Juvenile Delinquents, 42 Fed. Reg. at 39,809–22 (providing a suggested time at which parole becomes 
appropriate for a given inmate based on two input variables).  
 77 See 2018 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 11, at ch. 5, pt. A. The severity of a crime for 
which the defendant has been convicted determines the Guidelines Manual “offense level.” Id. Of-
fense levels range from a score of one, the least serious offense, to forty-three, the most serious of-
fense See id. (noting that an offense level of forty-three results in an automatic life sentence). A de-
fendant’s criminal history is assigned a point value based on the number of previous offenses and the 
severity of each offense. Id. § 4A1.1. This point value is then matched to a criminal history “category” 
of I through VI. Id. at ch. 5, pt. A. Defendants in category VI have the most extreme criminal histories 
and defendants in category I have the least serious criminal histories. Id. A judge determines the cor-
rect sentencing range by finding the range that matches with a defendant’s offense level and criminal 
history category. See id. (providing a specific sentencing range for each possible combination of of-
fense levels and criminal history categories). 
 78 See id. (generating longer sentences for more severe crimes or for defendants with more serious 
criminal histories). The Sentencing Guidelines Table is further divided into four “zones.” Id. These 
zones, labeled A through D are determined by a defendant’s offense level and criminal history catego-
ry. See id. (setting forth “zones” in guidelines). Zones have no bearing on sentence imposition but are 
used instead in consideration of matters such as probation or supervised release. Id. § 5B1.1. Less 
harsh Guideline ranges are generally found in zones that provide more favorable probation or super-
vised release conditions to defendants. Id. 
 79 See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 233 (2005) (noting that Congress initially created 
the Guidelines system as a mandatory system). 
 80 See id. at 264–65 (holding that mandatory Guidelines are unconstitutional under the Sixth 
Amendment). Although the Guidelines range must be calculated and considered by judges as adviso-
ry, judges are free to impose a sentence outside of the Guidelines range so long as the Guideline range 
is considered on the record and the judge states the reason for the departure. Id. 
 81 See 2018 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 11, at ch. 5, pt. A (failing to provide a mechanism 
for early release). The Sentencing Guidelines did have features built in to allow offenders to reduce 
their offense levels or criminal history points and thus receive less harsh sentences, such as a decrease 
in a defendant’s offense level if they “demonstrate acceptance of responsibility” for the crime, gener-
ally by pleading guilty or otherwise admitting to certain conduct. Id. § 3E1.1. Additionally, after 
Booker, judges could depart from the Sentencing Guidelines entirely. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 265 
(holding that, under the Sixth Amendment, facts which may have bearing on sentencing decisions, and 
which have been properly proven, must be considered as a means to properly tailor sentences). In 
1989, in Mistretta v. United States, the United States Supreme Court separately rejected a challenge to 
the constitutionality of the Sentencing Guidelines in which a criminal defendant challenged the Guide-
lines as an improper delegation of congressional power to an executive branch body. See 488 U.S. 
361, 371 (1989) (holding that the CCCA’s grant of authority to the Sentencing Commission was not 
an unconstitutional delegation of Congressional power in violation of the United States Constitution). 
2476 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 62:2463 
 In addition to abolishing federal parole, the CCCA severely limited the 
amount of good time credit a federal inmate could receive for good behavior 
while serving their sentence.82 Additionally, the CCCA codified that terms of 
imprisonment generally cannot be modified, restricting a court’s ability to 
modify a sentence after imposition.83 These changes, however, did not com-
pletely erase the federal early release system.84 Because of these new limita-
tions, or perhaps in spite of them, Congress added a new section to the federal 
criminal code—the compassionate release statute.85 Congress intended com-
passionate release act as a “safety valve” for the early release of eligible incar-
cerated persons now that parole was off the table.86 
In contrast to the now-abolished federal parole, which worked passively 
in the background after sentencing, compassionate release under the CCCA, 
and later the First Step Act, requires defendants to engage actively with the 
criminal justice system to reduce their sentence.87 Incarcerated persons were 
no longer automatically considered for compassionate release after a set period 
                                                                                                                           
 82 See Comprehensive Crime Control Act, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 211, 98 Stat. 1837, 1998–99 (1984) 
(codified in scattered sections of 18 and 28 U.S.C.) (amending the good time credit system to provide a 
lower good time credit accrual rate). The CCCA limited good time credits such that no more than fifty-
four days’ worth of credit could be accrued for each year of a sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b). For exam-
ple, an inmate serving a two-year sentence could accrue a maximum of 108 days, an inmate serving a 
three year sentence a maximum of 162 days, and so on. See id. (setting forth the calculation for good 
time credits). This limitation remains in effect today. Id. 
 83 See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (noting that federal courts may not modify a term of imprisonment 
except for certain elderly defendants and those who have an “extraordinary and compelling reason[]” 
warranting release). 
 84 See id. (providing a framework for early release in the form of compassionate release that sup-
planted the now-defunct parole system). 
 85 Id. (setting out the system by which federal inmates can seek early release from prison, but 
only allowing early release in the presence of an “extraordinary and compelling” circumstance, not in 
the ordinary course). 
 86 See Thompson, Frail, Old and Dying, supra note 1 (discussing the purpose of compassionate 
release with U.S. Senator Brian Schatz of Hawaii, who characterized the system as “the humane . . . 
and . . . fiscally responsible thing to do”). This section’s title and statutory text speak in terms of “re-
duction” to a sentence, and not “compassionate release.” See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (“Modifica-
tion of an Imposed Term of Imprisonment”); United States v. Brooker, 976 F.3d 228, 237 (2d Cir. 
2020) (“It bears remembering that compassionate release is a misnomer. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) in 
fact speaks of sentence reductions.”) (emphasis added). Nevertheless, the term “compassionate re-
lease” stuck, and to this day remains in regular usage in the federal criminal justice system. See BOP 
PROGRAM STATEMENT 5050.50, supra note 10, at 1–2 (referring to the statutory provisions of 18 
U.S.C. § 3582(c) as both “compassionate release” and “reduction in sentence”). 
 87 Compare Parole Commission and Reorganization Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-233, § 2, 90 
Stat. 219, 222 (allowing incarcerated persons to become eligible for parole automatically after com-
pleting of one-third of their sentence), with 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (requiring that a defendant 
submit a motion for compassionate release to a defendant’s sentencing court before compassionate 
release can be granted and requiring input from the defendant, the BOP, and the court). 
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of time; they had to actively solicit it.88 In compassionate release cases, courts 
could only reduce a sentence for “extraordinary and compelling reasons.”89 
Rather than embarking on the tedious journey of defining “extraordinary and 
compelling” itself, Congress delegated this task to the Sentencing Commis-
sion.90 Congress offered two pieces of affirmative guidance to the Sentencing 
Commission: first, an inmate’s rehabilitation is not “an extraordinary and com-
pelling reason” by itself.91 Second, judges granting compassionate release must 
act consistently with the Sentencing Commission’s regulations and policy 
statements.92 
Despite these instructions from Congress, the Sentencing Commission did 
not define “extraordinary and compelling reasons” until 2006, when it simply 
stated that the BOP Director was responsible for determining qualifying cir-
cumstances.93 Prior to 2006, the BOP granted compassionate release only to 
inmates with terminal illnesses, believing those inmates were the only group 
that did not present a recidivism or public safety risk.94 In 2006, the Sentencing 
                                                                                                                           
 88 See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (noting that courts do not automatically grant sentence modifi-
cations to eligible inmates, but instead grant compassionate release only “upon motion of the Director 
of the Bureau of Prisons, or upon motion of the defendant”). 
 89 Id. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). 
 90 See 28 U.S.C. § 994 (setting forth the duties of Sentencing Commission, including the promul-
gation of Sentencing Guidelines, which requires the Commission to create compassionate release 
guidance); Comprehensive Crime Control Act, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 217, 98 Stat. 1837, 2017–25 
(1984) (codified in scattered sections of 18 and 28 U.S.C.) (authorizing the Sentencing Commission to 
create guidelines and policy statements). 
 91 28 U.S.C. § 994(t) (“Rehabilitation of the defendant alone shall not be considered an extraordi-
nary and compelling reason.”). 
 92 See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (obligating district courts to deny motions for compassionate 
release if granting the motion would be inconsistent with a Sentencing Commission policy statement). 
The Sentencing Guidelines Manual reiterates that “rehabilitation of the defendant is not, by itself, an 
extraordinary and compelling reason.” 2018 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 11, § 1B1.13 cmt. n.3. 
Because courts cannot grant compassionate release for reasons inconsistent with the Sentencing 
Guidelines Manual, rehabilitation alone is an impermissible reason for granting early release based on 
the Sentencing Commission’s guidance as well as the statutory guidance. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A); 
2018 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 11, § 1B1.13 cmt. n.3. 
 93 See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1(A) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2006) 
[hereinafter 2006 GUIDELINES MANUAL] (“A determination made by the Director of the Bureau of 
Prisons that a particular case warrants a reduction for extraordinary and compelling reasons shall be 
considered as such . . . .”) (emphasis omitted). It does not appear that this broadening prompted the 
BOP to increase its use of the compassionate release program. See DOJ OIG 2013 COMPASSIONATE 
RELEASE MEMO, supra note 16, at 46 (noting the average of twenty-four prisoners released annually 
via compassionate release between 2006 and 2011). 
 94 See William W. Berry III, Extraordinary and Compelling: A Re-examination of the Justifica-
tions for Compassionate Release, 68 MD. L. REV. 850, 853 (2009) (citing FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CHANGE NOTICE NO. 5050.46, PROGRAM STATEMENT CONCERNING COM-
PASSIONATE RELEASE; PROCEDURES FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A) & 4205(g) 
(1998)) (explaining that the BOP, prior to November 2007, only granted compassionate release for 
defendants who were terminally ill, generally refusing other requests as contrary to the BOP’s goal to 
maintain public safety). 
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Commission began broadening its definition of “extraordinary and compel-
ling.”95 The 2006 Guidelines Manual stated that certain elderly incarcerated 
persons were eligible for release, in addition to those who were terminally ill.96 
In 2007, the Sentencing Commission expanded “extraordinary and com-
pelling” further, providing three specific instances in which compassionate 
release would be permissible: (1) defendants with terminal illnesses;97 (2) de-
fendants with serious permanent physical or medical conditions, or declining 
health;98 and (3) defendants who are the only living and capable caregivers of a 
minor child.99 The Sentencing Commission preserved a “catch all” provision 
that allowed for compassionate release in any other circumstances the BOP 
                                                                                                                           
 95 See 2006 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 93, § 1B1.13 cmt. background (noting the Sentenc-
ing Commission’s intent to provide broader compassionate release criteria, as well as a specific list of 
“extraordinary and compelling” circumstances in future iterations of the Guidelines Manual (emphasis 
omitted)). 
 96 Id. § 1B1.13. Under this guidance, defendants at least seventy years old who had served at least 
thirty years were eligible for release. Id. Beyond this, the determination of what constituted an “ex-
traordinary and compelling reason[]” remained solely in the discretion of the Director of the BOP. Id. 
cmt. 1. 
 97 U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1(A) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2007) [here-
inafter 2007 GUIDELINES MANUAL]. For the first circumstance, the Guidelines Manual’s Application 
Notes required that “[t]he defendant is suffering from a terminal illness” to be eligible for early re-
lease. Id. § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1(A)(i) (emphasis omitted). According to BOP guidance, an incarcerated 
person has a terminal medical condition if that person suffers from “a terminal, incurable disease 
[where] . . . life expectancy is eighteen (18) months or less.” BOP PROGRAM STATEMENT 5050.50, 
supra note 10, at 4. Usually, the Clinical Director of a federal prison facility makes the diagnosis. Id. 
The Guidelines Manual uses the term “defendant” to refer to incarcerated persons. 2018 GUIDELINES 
MANUAL, supra note 11, § 1B1.13. 
 98 2007 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 97, § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1(A). For the second circumstance, 
the Guidelines Manual required that: 
[t]he defendant is suffering from a permanent physical or mental condition, or is expe-
riencing deteriorating physical or mental health because of the aging process, that sub-
stantially diminishes the ability of the defendant to provide self-care within the envi-
ronment of a correctional facility and for which conventional treatment promises no 
substantial improvement. 
Id. § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1(A)(ii) (emphasis omitted). The BOP recommends compassionate release if an 
incarcerated person has “an incurable, progressive illness or . . . [if that person] ha[s] suffered a debili-
tating injury from which they will not recover.” BOP PROGRAM STATEMENT 5050.50, supra note 10, 
at 5. Furthermore, the BOP recommends consideration under this category if an incarcerated person is 
“[c]ompletely disabled, meaning the inmate cannot carry on any self-care and is totally confined to a 
bed or chair; or [is] [c]apable of only limited self-care and is confined to a bed or chair more than 50% 
of waking hours.” Id. 
 99 2007 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 97, § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1. Prison officials will consider the 
best interests of the minor when dealing with a motion for compassionate release under this category. 
Id. These requirements were later adopted by the First Step Act to apply to an incarcerated person’s 
incapacitated spouse or registered partner as well. Id. at 9–10. 
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determined to be “extraordinary and compelling.”100 Subsequent Sentencing 
Commission guidance has not deviated far from the 2007 criteria.101 
The most recent Guidelines Manual—promulgated in 2018—provides 
slightly broader guidance regarding extraordinary circumstances, and organiz-
es them more thematically.102 First, it creates the category of “Medical Condi-
tion of the Defendant” as an “extraordinary and compelling reason[]”, includ-
ing both terminal illness and physical, medical, or cognitive conditions that 
reduce the defendant’s ability to operate in a prison setting.103 Second, and 
newly spelled out in the Guidelines Manual, an inmate’s advanced age is an 
“extraordinary and compelling” circumstance warranting release.104 Third, the 
new “Family Circumstances” category includes not only situations in which a 
defendant is the only caregiver for their children, but also those in which a de-
fendant is the only caregiver for a spouse.105 Finally, the “catch all” provision 
remains exactly the same.106 
                                                                                                                           
 100 See 2007 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 97, § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1(A)(iv). (“As determined by 
the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, there exists in the defendant’s case an extraordinary and com-
pelling reason other than, or in combination with, the reasons described in [the preceding] subdivi-
sions . . . .”) (emphasis omitted). The BOP does not provide any affirmative guidance in its Program 
Statement on what circumstances qualify under this “catch all” provision. See BOP PROGRAM 
STATEMENT 5050.50, supra note 10, at 12 (failing to identify specific circumstances that would fall in 
this category). The BOP does provide several factors to consider when determining whether or not 
release is appropriate for a given defendant. See id. (requiring consideration of factors such as the 
defendant’s criminal history, disciplinary infractions, and proposed release plan). 
 101 2018 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 11, § 1B1.13 (providing mostly semantic changes to 
previous versions of compassionate release guidance). 
 102 See id. § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1 (organizing criteria by medical circumstances, age-related circum-
stances, family circumstances, and other circumstances). 
 103 Id. § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1, 1(A). The Guidelines list “metastatic solid-tumor cancer, amyotrophic 
lateral sclerosis (ALS), end-stage organ disease, and advanced dementia” as examples of qualifying 
terminal illnesses. Id. For further specific implementing information on medical compassionate re-
lease, see BOP PROGRAM STATEMENT 5050.50, supra note 10, at 4 (elaborating on the medical crite-
ria outlined in the Guidelines Manual by providing specific diagnoses and prognoses to look for in 
implementing the compassionate release program). 
 104 2018 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 11, § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1(B). The current Guidelines 
Manual now requires that to qualify for this category an inmate must be (1) at least sixty-five years 
old; (2) experiencing major deteriorations in health because of aging; and (3) served the lesser of ten 
years, or 75% of the term of imprisonment. Id. Additional BOP guidance clarifies and specifies the 
implementation of the Guidelines Manual. See BOP PROGRAM STATEMENT 5050.50, supra note 10, at 
1–2 (discussing the scope of BOP guidance and providing additional information pertaining to com-
passionate release to aid in the implementation of the compassionate release program). The BOP 
guidance echoes the Guidelines Manual’s requirements and offers a less strict requirement for elderly 
incarcerated persons with certain debilitative medical conditions. BOP PROGRAM STATEMENT 
5050.50, supra note 10, at 6. 
 105 2018 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 11, § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1(C). Under this category, the 
Guidelines Manual recommends granting compassionate release if “[t]he incapacitation of the defend-
ant’s spouse or registered partner when the defendant would be the only available caregiver for the 
spouse or registered partner.” Id. § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1(C)(ii). 
 106 Id. § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1(D). After the First Step Act shifted compassionate release decision-
making power to district courts, many courts relied on the spirit of this provision to grant compassion-
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Despite the definitional thicket presented by the phrase “extraordinary 
and compelling,” the actual process of compassionate release under the CCCA 
was, and remains, relatively straightforward.107 The BOP Director had the ex-
clusive power to make motions for compassionate release on a defendant’s 
behalf.108 Thus, under the CCCA, defendants first had to apply for release to 
the warden of the BOP facility in which they were incarcerated.109 Then, the 
warden would review the application with other prison officials and make an 
initial determination of whether an “extraordinary or compelling circum-
stance” existed.110 The warden referred approved applications to the Director 
of the BOP.111 Even with the warden’s approval, the Director of the BOP could 
decline to bring a motion in the defendant’s sentencing court.112 Some courts 
referred to this review as the BOP’s “gatekeeping” of motions.113 If the BOP 
Director brought a compassionate release motion, the judge’s responsibilities 
were limited to granting or denying the motion.114 If prison officials and the 
                                                                                                                           
ate release for novel circumstances. See United States v. Brooker, 976 F.3d 228, 234 (2d Cir. 2020) 
(concluding that the inconsistency between the statute and the Sentencing Guidelines gives courts 
wide discretion to determine what reasons are “extraordinary and compelling” for granting compas-
sionate release). 
 107 See 28 C.F.R. §§ 571.61–.64 (2021) (providing the procedure by which an inmate submits a 
compassionate release request to a warden, who reviews the request and refers it to senior staff at the 
BOP, and eventually to the BOP Director). 
 108 See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (setting forth the BOP’s role in bringing compassionate release 
motions); 28 C.F.R. § 571.62 (discussing the responsibilities of BOP staff seeking to bring compas-
sionate release motions, including the BOP Director’s authority to bring the motion to a court). 
 109 See 28 C.F.R. § 571.61 (requiring inmates submit written requests for compassionate release 
to the warden of the facility in which they are incarcerated). 
 110 See id. §§ 571.61, 571.62 (providing that the warden must review all requests for release with 
BOP General Counsel and either the BOP Medical Director or the BOP Assistant Director of the Cor-
rectional Programs Division, for compliance with Sentencing Commission and BOP guidance). 
 111 Id. A warden would also provide the BOP Director with a wide array of supporting documen-
tation, including information about the defendant’s criminal and disciplinary records, medical records, 
and presentence reports. See BOP PROGRAM STATEMENT 5050.50, supra note 10, at 13–14 (outlining 
all supporting documentation that must be submitted with a motion for compassionate release). Fur-
ther, the warden was required to provide the BOP Director with information about the defendant’s 
release plan, which includes, among other things, information on where and with whom a defendant 
would reside upon release. Id. at 14. 
 112 See 28 C.F.R. § 571.63 (providing that the warden, BOP General Counsel, or BOP Director 
can deny a request with written notice and a statement of reasons). The BOP Director’s decision not to 
bring a motion after a warden approved it was not judicially reviewable. See, e.g., Crowe v. United 
States, 430 F. App’x 484, 485 (6th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (“[A] number of courts have determined 
that the BOP’s decision regarding whether or not to file a motion for compassionate release is judicial-
ly unreviewable.”); Green v. Apker, No. 13-HC-2159, 2014 WL 3487247, at *2 (E.D.N.C. July 11, 
2014) (“[P]etitioner may not seek review of the BOP’s decision.”). 
 113 See United States v. Jones, 980 F.3d 1098, 1105 (6th Cir. 2020), abrogated by United States v. 
Navarro, 986 F.3d 668 (6th Cir. 2021) (noting that the BOP occupied a “preclusive gatekeeper posi-
tion” for compassionate release motions). 
 114 See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (providing courts with the final authority to grant or deny com-
passionate release). The BOP Director would typically work with the U.S. Attorney of the district in 
which the defendant was sentenced when bringing such motions to get prosecutorial input about 
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BOP Director agreed that an “extraordinary and compelling reason[]” existed, 
then sentencing courts rarely, if ever, disagreed.115 
Judges were also required to consider whether an inmate’s release was 
appropriate in light of the sentencing factors typically considered in the federal 
criminal justice system—commonly referred to as the “§ 3553(a) factors.”116 A 
judge must consider the § 3553(a) factors when imposing the initial sentence, 
which are intended to measure the severity of the crime and the defendant’s 
recidivism risk.117 
B And the First Step: Expansion of Compassionate Release  
in the Federal Criminal System 
Twenty-three years after passing the Comprehensive Crime Control Act, 
Congress revisited federal criminal justice reform.118 Of particular concern this 
time around was mass incarceration; the sheer magnitude of people in the fed-
eral prison system required substantial action.119 The federal prison population 
                                                                                                                           
whether to file for release. See 28 C.F.R. § 571.62 (requiring that the BOP consult with a U.S. Attor-
ney in the compassionate release process). 
 115 See, e.g., Crowe, 430 F. App’x at 485 (holding that the BOP’s decision not to bring a motion 
for compassionate release is not judicially reviewable); United States v. DiMasi, 220 F. Supp. 3d 173, 
201 (D. Mass. 2016) (accepting without challenge the BOP’s motion to grant compassionate release to 
a severely ill inmate); Sims v. Holencik, No. CV 09-00978, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133747, at *6 
(C.D. Cal. May 6, 2009) (emphasizing deference to BOP decisions regarding whether to bring com-
passionate release motions). 
 116 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The seven sentencing factors include (1) the nature and circumstanc-
es of the offense and the characteristics of the defendant; (2) whether the sentence reflects the severity 
of the offense, affords adequate deterrence, and upholds respect for the law; (3) whether the sentence 
is reasonable given the available sentences; (4) the kind of sentence and the relevant guidelines; (5) 
pertinent policy statements from the Sentencing Commission; (6) the need to avoid unwanted sentenc-
ing disparities among similar defendants; and (7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the 
offense. Id. 
 117 See id. (requiring the court to consider the sentencing factors to impose a “sufficient, but not 
greater than necessary” sentence). Outside of the guidelines and policy statements discussed in the 
fourth and fifth sentencing factors, the § 3553(a) factors are not binding constraints on judges or de-
finitive measures. See id. (failing to provide other constraints on judicial decision-making). 
 118 See Formerly Incarcerated Reenter Society Transformed Safely Transitioning Every Person 
(First Step) Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 (codified in scattered sections of 18 and 
34 U.S.C.) (amending significant portions of the federal criminal code to provide more lenient sen-
tences, prevent crime, and reduce the prison population). 
 119 See NATHAN JAMES, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45558, THE FIRST STEP ACT OF 2018: AN OVER-
VIEW 1 (2019), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45558 [https://perma.cc/ZTF9-LGD6] 
[hereinafter JAMES, THE FIRST STEP ACT] (discussing Congress’s concern with size of the federal 
prison population, which motivated much of the First Step Act’s substantive changes to the federal 
criminal code); Emily Tillett, Sens. Cory Booker and Mike Lee on Putting Aside Politics to Reform 
Criminal Justice, CBS (July 22, 2019), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/senators-cory-booker-mike-
lee-on-putting-aside-political-impasses-to-reform-criminal-justice/ [https://perma.cc/C3BC-8565] 
(recounting New Jersey Senator Cory Booker’s views on the First Step Act’s purpose of addressing 
mass incarceration). For a more robust discussion of the phenomenon of mass incarceration in the 
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grew steadily through the 1970s, but the CCCA’s “tough on crime” approach 
caused the population to exponentially increase from 1984 onward.120 Without 
a mechanism like parole to release inmates on the back end, the prison popula-
tion increased more than six-fold in the thirty years since 1984.121 
During the Obama Administration, a 2013 report from the Department of 
Justice’s Office of the Inspector General (DOJ OIG) harshly criticized the 
BOP’s handling of compassionate release since the passage of the CCCA in 
1984.122 The report highlights the BOP’s inconsistent application of compas-
sionate release criteria for medical reasons, the lack of a consistent timeline for 
processing applications, and the absence of procedures to inform potentially 
eligible inmates about the program.123 In addition, the DOJ OIG found that 
between 2006 and 2011, an average of twenty-four inmates were released from 
custody each year; approximately one-one-hundredth of a percent of the total 
federal prison population.124 Further study revealed significant hurdles for in-
mates seeking compassionate release, including the BOP’s inability to expedite 
                                                                                                                           
United States, see Ristroph, supra note 14 (discussing American criminal law’s emphasis on carceral 
solutions to crime).  
 120 See JAMES, THE FEDERAL PRISON POPULATION, supra note 20, at 2 (attributing the rise in the 
federal prison population to a harsher federal criminal code and the elimination of federal parole). 
 121 See id. (noting the rapid and substantial growth of the federal prison population from the 
1980s onward). In 1984, the BOP housed a total of 35,795 inmates. See BOP Population Statistics, 
supra note 14 (providing annual data on the federal prison population). In 2013, that number increased 
to 219,298 inmates, representing the peak volume of the federal prison population. Id. Since 2013, the 
federal prison population has decreased. Id. As of the end of 2020, when the BOP published its most 
recent official count, the current federal prison population stood at 152,164 inmates. Id. 
 122 See generally DOJ OIG 2013 COMPASSIONATE RELEASE MEMO, supra note 16 (reviewing the 
compassionate release program and finding a minimal number of requests were granted, and that BOP 
institutions lacked uniform timelines for reviewing requests). 
 123 Id. at 12. After interviews with twenty members of BOP institution staff, the OIG found that 
“the BOP failed to provide institution staff with adequate guidance regarding what an appropriate 
request for compassionate release is,” and that there was no administrative guidance defining “ex-
traordinary and compelling” circumstances. Id. Beyond calling for requests to be “expedite[d],” the 
BOP offered no affirmative guidance on how quickly compassionate release requests should be pro-
cessed. BOP PROGRAM STATEMENT 5050.50, supra note 10, at 15; DOJ OIG 2013 COMPASSIONATE 
RELEASE MEMO, supra note 16, at 30–31. Only a third of the institutions surveyed set deadlines for 
processing requests, ranging in length from five to sixty-five days. DOJ OIG 2013 COMPASSIONATE 
RELEASE MEMO, supra note 16, at 28. In some instances, at institutions with no enforced processing 
timeline, requests for compassionate release went unanswered for over five months. Id. at 27–28. The 
BOP had no requirement that inmates be informed about the compassionate release program. Id. at 31. 
In addition, only seven percent of handbooks distributed to inmates in BOP custody contained any 
mention of compassionate release. Id. The information in those handbooks varied significantly be-
cause each institution independently creates its handbook. Id. at 32. 
 124 Id. at 46; BOP Population Statistics, supra note 14. This percentage was calculated based on 
the release trends noted in the OIG memo and the publicly available population data provided by the 
BOP. See DOJ OIG 2013 COMPASSIONATE RELEASE MEMO, supra note 16, at 46 (noting the average 
of twenty-four prisoners released yearly); BOP Population Statistics, supra note 14 (noting a prison 
population of up to 217,768 persons in 2011). 
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the requests of terminally ill inmates.125 Even after the BOP modified the com-
passionate release criteria to expand eligibility for elderly and terminally ill 
inmates, compassionate release remained a rarity.126 
The dismal state of compassionate release was far from Congress’s only 
motivation to pass the First Step Act in 2018.127 Congress designed and mar-
keted the bill as a substantial overhaul of the federal criminal system meant to 
address the scourge of mass incarceration.128 The relevant portion of the legis-
lation, titled “Increasing the Use and Transparency of Compassionate Re-
lease,” adds approximately fifty words to the compassionate release statute.129 
This modification, although small, significantly decentralized the mechanisms 
                                                                                                                           
 125 See DOJ OIG 2013 COMPASSIONATE RELEASE MEMO, supra note 16, at 27–28 (describing the 
BOP’s failure to “consider the special circumstances of medical compassionate release requests” (em-
phasis omitted)). For example, one prisoner was given a six-month life expectancy upon a diagnosis 
of liver failure. Thompson, Frail, Old and Dying, supra note 1. That prisoner, Anthony Bell, applied 
for compassionate release. Id. It took six months for the BOP to render its decision, two days after 
which Mr. Bell died. Id. 
 126 See DOJ OIG 2015 AGING INMATES MEMO, supra note 12, at 6 (noting that even with updated 
compassionate release criteria, few inmates who requested release were successful); Thompson, Frail, 
Old and Dying, supra note 1 (discussing the rarity of compassionate release). In its 2013 review of the 
compassionate release program, the DOJ OIG attributed the rarity of compassionate release to BOP 
staff’s misunderstanding of the program’s function, ineffective procedures to inform eligible inmates, 
and a lack of internal consistency on when to grant release. DOG OIG 2013 COMPASSIONATE RE-
LEASE MEMO, supra note 16, at i–iii. 
 127 JAMES, THE FIRST STEP ACT, supra note 119, at 1. 
 128 Id. The First Step Act made a number of other meaningful reforms to sentencing and criminal 
procedure, such as reducing certain mandatory minimums and improving access to rehabilitation pro-
grams. Id.; see Formerly Incarcerated Reenter Society Transformed Safely Transitioning Every Person 
(First Step) Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 (2018) (codified in scattered section of 
18 and 34 U.S.C.) (amending significant portions of the federal criminal code). In 2018, Senators 
Brian Schatz of Hawai’i, Mike Lee of Utah, and Patrick Leahy of Vermont introduced a bill aimed at 
amending the compassionate release process. See Granting Release and Compassion Effectively 
(GRACE) Act of 2018, S. 2471, 115th Cong., § 2 (failed in committee) (permitting inmates to bring 
their own motions for compassionate release). Congress passed the GRACE Act as incorporated into 
the First Step Act. See First Step Act § 603(b) (setting out language nearly identical to the GRACE 
Act). In 2020, Senator Schatz and Senator Richard Durbin of Illinois introduced the Emergency 
GRACE Act, which further streamlined and expedited the compassionate release process in recogni-
tion of the COVID-19 pandemic; however, the Senate did not vote on it. See Emergency Grants of 
Release and Compassion Effectively (Emergency GRACE) Act of 2020, S. 3698, 116th Cong. § 3 
(failed in committee) (providing for expedited review and approval of compassionate release mo-
tions). 
 129 See First Step Act § 603(b), 132 Stat. at 5239 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)). The Act 
amends 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) to add the following words after “upon motion of the Director of 
the Bureau of Prisons”: 
or upon motion of the defendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all administra-
tive rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defend-
ant’s behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of 
the defendant’s facility, whichever is earlier . . . . 
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (as amended by the First Step Act § 603(b)). 
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for obtaining compassionate release.130 It allowed inmates to bring motions 
directly to their sentencing courts for a sentence reduction, after first attempt-
ing to have the BOP bring that motion on their behalf.131 
In effect, the First Step Act’s amendments to the compassionate release 
system meant prison wardens and the BOP Director no longer held exclusive 
authority to bring motions for compassionate release.132 Many judges de-
scribed this amendment as the removal of the BOP’s gatekeeping function.133 
Sentencing judges became the key players in determining when to grant com-
passionate release.134 As is the case with most judicial decisions, a district 
court’s decision to grant or deny compassionate relief is reviewable by the ap-
propriate circuit court on appeal.135 The reviewability of compassionate release 
decisions was a notable departure from the historic parole system and the pre-
First Step Act compassionate release system, neither of which were subject to 
appellate review.136 
Despite this change in procedure, the Act does not purport to change the 
substantive criteria used to assess individual motions for compassionate re-
                                                                                                                           
 130 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). 
 131 Id. In other words, inmates are only entitled to bring a motion for compassionate release to 
their sentencing court (1) after pursuing and losing all appeals within the BOP’s administrative 
framework, or (2) after thirty days have passed since a warden received the inmate’s request. Id. De-
spite some contention among district courts, most courts have denied motions for compassionate re-
lease if the inmate has not first pursued administrative options within the BOP. See, e.g., United States 
v. Edwards, 456 F. Supp. 3d 953, 966 (M.D. Tenn. 2020) (denying the compassionate release motion 
of an inmate who had not pursued administrative remedies first). This requirement is often referred to 
as the “exhaustion requirement.” Id. 
 132 See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (allowing defendants seeking compassionate release to circum-
vent the BOP after meeting the exhaustion requirement). 
 133 See, e.g., United States v. McCoy, 981 F.3d 271, 274 (4th Cir. 2020) (“The First Step Act 
removed the BOP from that gatekeeping role, authorizing defendants themselves to file motions for 
sentence reductions.”); United States v. Jones, 980 F.3d 1098, 1105 (6th Cir. 2020), abrogated by 
United States v. Navarro, 986 F.3d 668 (6th Cir. 2021) (“[T]he First Step Act . . . ousted the BOP 
from its preclusive gatekeeper position . . . .”). 
 134 See, e.g., United States v. Aruda, 993 F.3d 797, 801–02 (9th Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (“The 
Sentencing Commission’s statements in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 may inform a district court’s discretion for 
§ 3582(c)(1)(A) motions filed by a defendant, but they are not binding.”); McCoy, 981 F.3d at 281 
(holding that courts retain the discretion to determine what constitutes an “extraordinary and compel-
ling reason[]” justifying compassionate release). 
 135 See United States v. Gunn, 980 F.3d 1178, 1181 (7th Cir. 2020) (holding that district court 
decisions regarding compassionate release are “subject to deferential appellate review”); Jones, 980 
F.3d at 1109 (“[T]he passage of the First Step Act rendered § 1B1.13 ‘inapplicable’ . . . .”). 
 136 Compare Crowe v. United States, 430 F. App’x 484, 485 (6th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (holding 
that federal courts do not have the authority to review the BOP’s decision not to bring a motion for 
compassionate release to a defendant’s sentencing court), and Zannino v. Arnold, 531 F.2d 687, 690 
(3d Cir. 1976) (finding the federal judiciary has limited discretion to review parole board decisions), 
with Gunn, 980 F.3d at 1181 (stating that appellate courts may review compassionate release deci-
sions). 
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lease.137 Courts are still required to assess inmates moving for release against 
the sentencing factors outlined in § 3553(a), as they had prior to the First Step 
Act.138 Just as before the First Step Act, defendants must present the court with 
an “extraordinary and compelling” circumstance for their release.139 If a 
court’s reasoning does not conflict with the policy statements or the factors, the 
court may grant the motion and release the inmate.140 As was the case in 1984, 
Congress left the task of defining “extraordinary and compelling” to the Sen-
tencing Commission.141 The problem, however, is that the First Step Act re-
wrote the compassionate release statute to be incompatible with the policy 
statements in the Guidelines Manual.142 
This raises a confounding question of the Guideline Manual’s applicabil-
ity.143 The current 2018 Guidelines Manual still discusses compassionate re-
lease in a manner that implies only the BOP Director can bring release mo-
tions.144 To make matters worse, as of 2021, the Sentencing Commission has 
                                                                                                                           
 137 See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (requiring a defendant seeking compassionate release to proffer 
an “extraordinary and compelling reason[]” consistent with the applicable Sentencing Commission 
guidance). 
 138 Id. § 3553(a). See supra note 116–117 for an overview of the sentencing factors, which gener-
ally provide the framework courts use to determine the severity of a crime and the need to punish 
certain conduct. 
 139 See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) (requiring the presence of an “extraordinary and compelling 
reason[]” to grant compassionate release). 
 140 Id.; see also United States v. Long, 997 F.3d 342, 355 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (“[C]ourts must apply 
any ‘applicable policy statements’ issued by the Sentencing Commission [to compassionate release 
motions].” (emphasis added)). 
 141 See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (requiring grants of compassionate release to be consistent with 
the Sentencing Commission’s policy statements); 28 U.S.C. § 994(t) (delegating the responsibility of 
promulgating policy statements to the Sentencing Commission). 
 142 Compare 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (indicating the circumstances in which inmates can bring 
a motion for compassionate release on their own behalf), with 2018 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 
11, § 1B1.13 (implying that only the BOP Director can bring motions for compassionate release on a 
defendant’s behalf). 
 143 See Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 38 (1993) (“[C]ommentary in the Guidelines Manu-
al that interprets or explains a guideline is authoritative unless it violates the Constitution or a federal 
statute, or is inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous reading of, that guideline.”). Additionally, be-
cause decisions to grant compassionate release must be “consistent with applicable policy statements,” 
many courts now find that the Guidelines Manual, which was written when the BOP Director had 
exclusive authority to bring compassionate release motions, is no longer applicable. See 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3582(c)(1)(A) (providing avenues for both the BOP Director and inmates to pursue motions for 
compassionate release); United States v. Brooker, 976 F.3d 228, 234 (2d Cir. 2020) (concluding that 
the inconsistency between the statute and the Sentencing Guidelines gives courts wide discretion to 
determine what reasons are “extraordinary and compelling” for granting compassionate release); 2018 
GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 11, § 1B1.13 (discussing compassionate release in the context of 
only the BOP Director bringing such motions). 
 144 See 2018 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 11, § 1B1.13 (discussing the BOP Director’s 
exclusive authority to bring compassionate release motions). 
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only one active voting member.145 This is three short of the quorum needed to 
update the Guidelines, and six short of a fully staffed Commission.146 The task 
of resolving the conflict between statute and regulation thus falls to the judici-
ary, providing a prime opportunity for judges to be on the front lines of this 
change in law.147 
II. COMPASSION OR CONSISTENCY: THE COURTS DIVERGE ON 
APPROPRIATE GROUNDS FOR COMPASSIONATE RELEASE 
As one might expect, the inconsistency between the compassionate re-
lease statute and relevant administrative guidance has led to inconsistent appli-
cation of the law between jurisdictions.148 From the time the First Step Act 
took effect in December 2018 through February 2020, the federal judiciary 
adjudicated only a few hundred compassionate release motions.149 Then, start-
ing in March 2020, when the severity of the COVID-19 pandemic became 
                                                                                                                           
 145 See About the Commissioners, U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, https://www.ussc.gov/commissioners 
[https://perma.cc/B84K-56N3] [hereinafter About the Commissioners] (providing the biographies of 
current and past Commissioners). The sole voting member of the Sentencing Commission is Judge 
Charles R. Breyer, U.S. District Court Judge for the Northern District of California. Id. Judge Breyer 
has served on the Sentencing Commission since 2013, and his term expires on October 31, 2021. Id. 
As previous commissioners’ terms expired, Presidents Trump and Biden did not nominate new com-
missioners to replace them, slowly reducing the number of active commissioners to one. Id. The Sen-
tencing Commission can only perform its duties when a quorum of commissioners is present, which is 
four out of seven members. 28 U.S.C. § 995(d). With just one member, it is impossible for the Com-
mission to meet quorum and conduct business. See id. (requiring the presence of at least four commis-
sioners for the Sentencing Commission to exercise its authority). 
 146 See 28 U.S.C. § 995(d) (requiring the presence of at least four active Commissioners to prom-
ulgate new Guidelines). 
 147 See Stinson, 508 U.S. at 38 (providing the statutory provisions in the CCCA and the Sentenc-
ing Reform Act of 1984 (SRA) for setting aside Guidelines Manual provisions that are inconsistent 
with the relevant statutes); United States v. Cantu, 423 F. Supp. 3d 345, 352 (S.D. Tex. 2019) (noting 
that the compassionate release “statute ‘does [not] define—or place any limits on—what “extraordi-
nary and compelling reasons” might warrant such a reduction’” in sentence length (alteration in origi-
nal) (quoting Crowe v. United States, 430 F. App’x 484, 485 (6th Cir. 2011))). The problem of con-
flicting legislation and regulation in criminal law is not unique to compassionate release. See Lauren 
M. Ouziel, Democracy, Bureaucracy, and Criminal Justice Reform, 61 B.C. L. REV. 523, 540–75 
(2020) (discussing the sometimes-conflicting roles and duties of democratically-elected legislators, 
appointed bureaucrats, and civil servants in matters of criminal justice, and how overlapping authority 
can make it unclear which bodies need to act on a given law). Elected legislators and appointed regu-
lators often find themselves struggling to manage overlaps in authority, even when both sides are 
pursuing the same policy goals. Id. at 575–79. 
 148 Compare Brooker, 976 F.3d at 234 (holding that the First Step Act allows judges to consider a 
wide array of “extraordinary [and compelling] circumstances” to grant compassionate release), with 
United States v. Bryant, 996 F.3d 1243, 1247 (11th Cir. 2021) (holding that the First Step Act’s pro-
cedural changes did not affect substantive criteria for compassionate release). 
 149 See DOJ OIG 2013 COMPASSIONATE RELEASE MEMO, supra note 16, at 46 (stating that be-
tween 2006 and 2011 an average of twenty-four inmates per year were released via compassionate 
release). 
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widely known, the number of motions swelled to almost 11,000 in three 
months.150 
This deluge of motions, driven by COVID-19, gave almost all federal 
courts ample opportunity to weigh in on how compassionate release ought to 
work in the First Step era.151 Surveying 673 district court judges and 179 cir-
cuit court judges seemingly yields 852 differing opinions on the matter, with 
some decisions completely contradicting others.152 At its core, the divergence 
of opinion regarding the definition of the two words “extraordinary” and 
“compelling” comes down to the definition of one other word: “applicable.”153 
Section A summarizes the point of view of the majority of circuits that the 
Guidelines Manual is no longer authoritative following the First Step Act and 
provides examples of novel circumstances for which district judges have 
granted compassionate release.154 Section B reviews relevant circuit court de-
cisions upholding departures from the Guidelines Manual and provides insight 
into the new role of appellate courts in the compassionate release process.155 
Section C describes the minority camp of district judges who maintain that the 
Guidelines Manual is authoritative and binding after the First Step Act’s re-
forms.156 Section D provides a summary of two opinions from the U.S. Court 
                                                                                                                           
 150 See United States v. Jones, 980 F.3d 1098, 1100 & n.1 (6th Cir. 2020), abrogated by United 
States v. Navarro, 986 F.3d 668 (6th Cir. 2021) (citing Keri Blakinger & Joseph Neff, Thousands of 
Sick Federal Prisoners Sought Compassionate Release. 98 Percent Were Denied., THE MARSHALL 
PROJECT (Oct. 7, 2020), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/10/07/thousands-of-sick-federal-
prisoners-sought-compassionate-release-98-percent-were-denied [https://perma.cc/7ZS9-MMPW]) 
(characterizing the surge of compassionate release motions as a product of the “forces of law and 
nature”); U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, THE FIRST STEP ACT OF 2018: ONE YEAR OF IMPLEMENTATION 47 
(2020) (noting a “five-fold increase” in the use of compassionate release after passage of the First Step 
Act). 
 151 See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 451 F. Supp. 3d 392, 401 (E.D. Pa. 2020) (discussing 
whether a defendant’s numerous health problems, which made him more susceptible to COVID-19, 
formed a sufficient basis for compassionate release under the First Step Act); United States v. Cantu, 
423 F. Supp. 3d 345, 350–52 (S.D. Tex. 2019) (analyzing how the First Step Act impacted the func-
tion of the federal compassionate release system to determine whether a defendant’s family circum-
stances warranted release). 
 152 Compare Rodriguez, 451 F. Supp. 3d at 401 (finding that a defendant’s increased risk of con-
tracting COVID-19 constituted an “extraordinary and compelling reason[]” to grant compassionate 
release), and United States v. Maumau, No. 08-cr-00758-11, 2020 WL 806121, at *5 (D. Utah Feb. 
18, 2020) (granting compassionate release based on post-conviction changes in the law that meant the 
defendant would have faced a more lenient sentence today), with United States v. Lynn, No. 89-0072, 
2019 WL 3805349, at *5 (S.D. Ala. Aug. 13, 2019) (holding that increased susceptibility to COVID-
19 is not an “extraordinary and compelling reason[]”), and United States v. Watford, No. 97-CR-
26(2), 2021 WL 533555, at *5 (N.D. Ind. Feb. 12, 2021) (declining to find that a post-conviction 
change in sentencing law qualifies as “an extraordinary and compelling reason”). 
 153 See Jones, 980 F.3d at 1109 (questioning the applicability of the outdated Guidelines Manual 
and noting that “the policy statement does not wholly survive the First Step Act’s promulgation”). 
 154 See infra notes 158–191 and accompanying text. 
 155 See infra notes 192–217 and accompanying text. 
 156 See infra notes 218–232 and accompanying text. 
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of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit that support this minority viewpoint—the 
first by implication, and the second explicitly.157 
A. Compassion: District Courts Take Greater Liberty to  
Find Reasons to Grant Compassionate Release 
The current compassionate release statute, in addition to requiring the 
presence of an “extraordinary and compelling” circumstance, requires that the 
decision to reduce a sentence be consistent with applicable Sentencing Com-
mission policy statements.158 The current version of the Guidelines Manual 
refers only to “motion[s] of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons” for compas-
sionate release.159 The catch-all provision in the Application Notes also refers 
to “extraordinary and compelling reason[s]” not listed “[a]s determined by the 
Director of the Bureau of Prisons.”160 In other words, despite the language of 
the First Step Act, the Guidelines Manual is written to imply that the BOP Di-
rector holds exclusive authority to bring compassionate release motions.161 
Given this contradictory language, judges making compassionate release 
decisions that are inconsistent with the Guidelines Manual and policy state-
ments may nevertheless be acting within the compassionate release statute’s 
boundaries.162 In other words, if a policy statement applies only to the BOP 
Director, a district judge has the discretion under the First Step Act to disregard 
that policy statement for compassionate release motions brought directly by 
                                                                                                                           
 157 See infra notes 233–249 and accompanying text. 
 158 See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (“[A] reduction [must be] consistent with applicable policy 
statements issued by the Sentencing Commission . . . .” (emphasis added)); Jones, 980 F.3d at 1109 
(“[T]he passage of the First Step Act rendered § 1B1.13 ‘inapplicable’ . . . .”). 
 159 See United States v. Brooker, 976 F.3d 228, 236 (2d Cir. 2020) (discussing the language in the 
Guidelines Manual that refers to the BOP Director’s capability to bring compassionate release mo-
tions, and the conflicting language in the compassionate release statute which also refers to a defend-
ant’s ability to bring such a motion on their own behalf); 2018 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 11, 
§ 1B1.13 (“Upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), 
the court may reduce a term of imprisonment . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 160 2018 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 11, § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1(D) (“As determined by the 
Director of the Bureau of Prisons, there exists in the defendant’s case an extraordinary and compelling 
reason other than, or in combination with, the reasons described in subdivisions (A) through (C).”); 
see Brooker, 976 F.3d at 236 (“[The catch-all provision] cannot constrain district courts’ discretion to 
consider whether any reasons are extraordinary and compelling.”). 
 161 2018 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 11, § 1B1.13 (offering compassionate release guid-
ance with reference to the BOP Director bringing such a motion); see Brooker, 976 F.3d at 234 (not-
ing that “section 1B1.13 still refers in multiple places to the BOP having the exclusive authority to 
bring a compassionate release motion”). 
 162 See Brooker, 976 F.3d at 234 (“[T]he First Step Act freed district courts to exercise their dis-
cretion in determining what are extraordinary circumstances.”); United States v. Young, 458 F. Supp. 
3d 838, 850 (M.D. Tenn. 2020) (granting compassionate release for a model inmate who would have 
received a more lenient sentence under modern criminal law). 
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defendants.163 Currently, a majority of district courts subscribe to this interpre-
tation.164 With the constraints of the Guidelines Manual removed, the only lim-
itation on district courts’ discretion is the statutory language requiring an “ex-
traordinary and compelling” circumstance for release.165 Needless to say, this 
is a lax constraint.166 
Some novel reasons justifying release are clearly inspired by the Guide-
lines Manual, despite not following the Manual to the letter.167 For example, in 
the 2019 case United States v. Beck, an earlier compassionate release decision, 
the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina held that a 
federal prison facility’s failure to provide adequate medical care to a severely 
ill defendant constituted an “extraordinary and compelling” circumstance.168 
Similarly, in 2020, in United States v. Rodriguez, the U.S. District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted compassionate release on the grounds 
                                                                                                                           
 163 See Brooker, 976 F.3d at 234 (requiring that a judge may only grant compassionate release for 
reasons consistent with Sentencing Commission policy statements); United States v. Gunn, 980 F.3d 
1178, 1181 (7th Cir. 2020) (noting that, because the Sentencing Commission’s policy statement is 
written in such a way to apply only to the BOP Director, the policy statement does not apply to mo-
tions for compassionate release brought directly by defendants). 
 164 See, e.g., United States v. Maumau, No. 08-cr-00758-11, 2020 WL 806121, at *5 (D. Utah 
Feb. 18, 2020) (finding that because the defendant would face a lighter sentence under current sen-
tencing law than when the defendant was sentenced, the original sentence constituted an “extraordi-
nary and compelling ground[]” warranting compassionate release); United States v. Walker, No 11 
CR 270, 2019 WL 5268752, at *2–3 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 17, 2019) (granting compassionate release to an 
inmate with an excellent disciplinary record who was a veteran suffering from PTSD and had a termi-
nally ill mother); United States v. Cantu-Rivera, No. CR H-89-204, 2019 WL 2578272, at *2 (S.D. 
Tex. June 24, 2019) (granting release for an elderly defendant who demonstrated an “extraordinary 
degree of rehabilitation” during the thirty years he was incarcerated). 
 165 See United States v. Rodriguez, 451 F. Supp. 3d 392, 397 (E.D. Pa. 2020) (“[R]estricting the 
Court to those reasons set forth in § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1(A)–(C) would effectively preserve to a large 
extent the BOP’s role as exclusive gatekeeper . . . .” (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. 
Redd, 444 F. Supp. 3d 717, 721, 725–26 (E.D. Va. 2020))). 
 166 See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (providing no specific guidance on what constitutes an “ex-
traordinary and compelling reason[]” and delegating the task of defining those circumstances to the 
Sentencing Commission). 
 167 See, e.g., Rodriguez, 451 F. Supp. 3d at 400–01 (holding that an inmate’s increased risk of con-
tracting COVID-19 due to underlying medical conditions constituted an “extraordinary and compelling 
reason[]” for compassionate release); United States v. Lisi, 440 F. Supp. 3d 246, 252 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) 
(finding that the defendant’s status as the sole available caregiver for his severely ill mother was “ex-
traordinary and compelling”). 
 168 425 F. Supp. 3d 573, 580–82 (M.D.N.C. 2019). The defendant in Beck pleaded guilty to feder-
al drug and firearm charges and received a 165-month sentence. Id. at 575. She had served approxi-
mately seventy-six months of that sentence at the time of her motion. Id. The defendant sought medi-
cal attention for potential breast cancer in 2017. Id. She received a diagnosis of metastatic breast can-
cer over a year later. Id. After surgery to remove tumors, physicians recommended additional chemother-
apy, but seventeen months passed before the BOP allowed the defendant to see an oncologist. Id. at 576. 
By this point, too much time had elapsed since surgery for chemotherapy and radiation to be effective, 
and the defendant’s cancer spread to her lymph nodes. Id. at 580. The court described the medical care 
provided by the BOP as “grossly inadequate” and “abysmal,” further noting that “[a]bsent judicial over-
sight, [the defendant] is unlikely to receive better treatment.” Id. at 580–81. 
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that a defendant’s pre-existing health conditions made him particularly suscep-
tible to contracting COVID-19.169 The BOP facility housing the defendant had 
reported several cases of COVID-19 already, further exacerbating the inmate’s 
risk.170 Under the Guidelines Manual and Sentencing Commission guidance, 
these two cases do not necessarily fall into the “medical circumstances” cate-
gory of “extraordinary and compelling reasons,” but these sources laid the 
groundwork for the inferential steps the Beck and Rodriguez courts took to 
reach their ultimate decisions.171 
Other courts that subscribe to this interpretation have gone even further to 
grant compassionate release, focusing on sentencing equity and consistency as 
the basis for relief.172 In 2020, in United States v. Maumau, the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Utah compared an inmate’s existing sentence to the 
sentence he would have received if sentenced today.173 The Maumau court 
found that an unusually long sentence was one of several reasons that support-
                                                                                                                           
 169 Rodriguez, 451 F. Supp. 3d at 400–01. The defendant in Rodriguez was serving a twenty-year 
sentence for drug and firearm offenses. Id. at 394. He had diabetes, high blood pressure, and liver 
abnormalities. Id. The court noted that diabetes patients have COVID-19 mortality rates more than 
double the average rate, meaning the defendant was at an elevated risk of death if he contracted 
COVID. Id. (citing WORLD HEALTH ORG., REPORT OF THE WHO-CHINA JOINT MISSION ON CORO-
NAVIRUS DISEASES 2019 (COVID-19) 12 (2020), https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/corona
viruse/who-china-joint-mission-on-covid-19-final-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/M3KP-XGJ9]). 
 170 Id. at 401–03. The defendant was housed at FCI Elkton, which at the time had the sixth-
highest number of confirmed COVID-19 cases among inmates. See COVID-19, FED. BUREAU OF 
PRISONS, https://www.bop.gov/coronavirus/index.jsp [https://perma.cc/ZW7B-7VJK] (providing data 
on COVID-19 cases in federal prisons). In addition to the risk of COVID-19, the court concluded that 
the defendant’s exemplary rehabilitative record and the fact that he was near the end of his sentence 
weighed in favor of finding “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for granting compassionate re-
lease. Rodriguez, 451 F. Supp. 3d at 405–06. 
 171 See Rodriguez, 451 F. Supp. 3d at 400–05 (granting compassionate release to a defendant with 
a preexisting medical condition that made him especially vulnerable to contracting COVID-19); Beck, 
425 F. Supp. 3d at 580–82 (granting compassionate release to a severely ill defendant who was receiv-
ing grossly inadequate medical care while incarcerated); 2018 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 11, 
§ 1B1.13 cmt. n.1 (providing that compassionate release may be granted for existing medical circum-
stances, but not explicitly listing the fear of contracting a serious illness or condition in the future). 
 172 See, e.g., United States v. Price, 496 F. Supp. 3d 83, 88 (D.D.C. 2020) (granting compassion-
ate release to a defendant who would have received only fifteen years, rather than a life sentence, 
under newly revised sentencing law); United States v. Vigneau, 473 F. Supp. 3d 31, 36–40 (D.R.I. 
2020) (holding that the Sentencing Guidelines becoming advisory, rather than mandatory, was a “con-
sider[ation] . . . in determining whether to grant compassionate release”); United States v. Maumau, 
No. 08-cr-00758-11, 2020 WL 806121, at *5 (D. Utah Feb. 18, 2020) (finding that more lenient mod-
ern sentencing regimes justified granting compassionate release to defendants sentenced to longer 
sentences under older laws). 
 173 2020 WL 806121, at *5. The defendant in Maumau was serving a fifty-five-year sentence for 
robbery and firearms offenses. Id. The judge presiding over the original sentencing proceedings had 
expressed “distaste” with the severity of the mandatory sentence that came with the defendant’s 
charged crimes. Id. 
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ed granting the defendant’s motion for compassionate release.174 The court 
gave the defendant, who was convicted of a firearms offense, a harsh sentence 
due to a “stacking” provision.175 The stacking provision added twenty-five 
years to the defendant’s sentence due to a prior offense under the same law.176 
The First Step Act clarified the stacking provision to make it less severe.177 
Had the court sentenced the defendant after the First Step Act, his sentence 
would have been twenty-five years shorter.178 Given this change in the law, the 
court concluded that the harshness of the sentence was “an extraordinary and 
compelling reason” warranting release.179 
Back east, in 2020, the U.S. District Court for the District of Rhode Island 
took Maumau a step further in United States v. Vigneau.180 In Vigneau, the de-
fendant had been convicted of a marijuana conspiracy in the 1990s, when the 
Sentencing Guidelines were mandatory.181 The Vigneau court discussed several 
reasons for granting the defendant’s motion.182 First, the court highlighted that 
because the defendant had been sentenced under mandatory, rather than advi-
sory, guidelines, it was entirely possible that he would have received a signifi-
cantly lighter sentence had he been sentenced today.183 Second, the court com-
pared the defendant’s sentence of thirty years to the average sentence imposed 
                                                                                                                           
 174 See id. at *6 (noting that prosecutors were “incorrect in suggesting that courts have never 
provided compassionate release due to lengthy sentences” and providing examples). 
 175 Id. at *5. “Stacking” is triggered for certain federal firearms offenses when a defendant is 
convicted for that firearms offense a subsequent time; that is, when a defendant commits the same 
offense more than once. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The stacking provision automatically adds additional 
time to a prison sentence in this case. See id. (citing 18 U.S.C.§ 924(c)) (recounting that the defend-
ant’s sentence was automatically increased due to the defendant’s prior firearms offenses). 
 176 See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (triggering an additional mandatory minimum sentence for repeat vio-
lations of this statute). 
 177 See First Step Act, Pub. L. No. 115-391 § 403, 132 Stat. 5221 (2018) (clarifying the statutory 
stacking provision to provide a more lenient sentence). 
 178 Maumau, 2020 WL 806121, at *7 (citing United States v. Urkevich, No. 8:03CR37, 2019 WL 
6037391, at *2–4 (D. Neb. Nov. 14, 2019), appeal dismissed, No. 20-1603, 2020 WL 5642024 (8th 
Cir. Apr. 1, 2020)). 
 179 See id. (“[T]his court concludes that the changes in how § 924(c) sentences are calculated is a 
compelling and extraordinary reason to provide relief on the facts here.”). 
 180 See 473 F. Supp. 3d 31, 36–40 (D.R.I. 2020) (holding that the defendant’s unusually long 
sentence, changes in the sentencing guidelines, and changing attitudes toward marijuana constituted 
“extraordinary and compelling reasons” to grant compassionate release). 
 181 Id. at 38. The Supreme Court found that requiring courts to impose mandatory sentences with-
in Guideline ranges was unconstitutional in 2005. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 264–65 
(2005). The Booker decision rendered the Guidelines advisory, providing district court judges with 
wider discretion to consider how other sentencing factors, especially the § 3553(a) factors, could war-
rant a sentence above or below a calculated Guidelines range. See id. (holding that judges may impose 
a sentence outside of a Guidelines range if there is good reason to do so and the Guidelines range is 
calculated on the record). 
 182 Vigneau, 473 F. Supp. 3d at 36–40. 
 183 See id. at 38 (“The Court in sentencing Mr. Vigneau was not allowed to consider a sentence 
outside the [Guidelines] range.”). 
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for marijuana conspiracies and the sentences imposed for “more heinous” 
crimes, such as murder.184 The court stated that the defendant’s sentence was 
unusually and unjustifiably long given those comparisons.185 Finally, and most 
interestingly, the court considered that marijuana was now legal or decriminal-
ized in many states, despite its continued illegality at the federal level, a 
change since the time when this defendant was sentenced.186 The court found 
that all of these circumstances constituted “extraordinary and compelling” rea-
sons to grant compassionate release, despite the fact that none of these reason 
are explicitly listed in the Guidelines Manual.187 
Finally, and notably, in United States v. Cantu—decided in 2019 as one of 
the earliest compassionate release cases after the First Step Act—the U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of Texas granted release because prosecu-
tors agreed that the defendant should be released.188 That court noted the nov-
elty of its own decision stemmed from the authority the First Step Act granted 
to the court.189 The court further noted that it would be illogical under the new 
statutory system to allow the BOP to continue to act as the gatekeeper for mo-
tions for compassionate release under the circumstances.190 In sum, these 
courts are using their newfound discretion to enlarge the universe of “extraor-
                                                                                                                           
 184 See id. at 37–38 (citing U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, 2019 ANNUAL REPORT AND SOURCEBOOK OF 
FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 64 (2020), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-
and-publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2019/2019-Annual-Report-and-Sourcebook.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/MYK5-UW8V]) (providing the average length of sentences imposed in 2019 for a 
variety of crimes). 
 185 See id. (finding that the defendant’s marijuana trafficking and money laundering convictions 
resulted in a sentence longer than the average sentences imposed for murder, sexual abuse, and kid-
napping—a comparison the court found intolerable). 
 186 See id. at 38 (noting that the court was entitled to take notice of the “changing legal landscape” 
with regard to marijuana, despite marijuana’s illegality at the federal level). 
 187 See id. at 39 (“Reviewing all the information in front of the Court, the Court finds that the 
factors recounted above represent extraordinary and compelling circumstances supporting the need to 
reduce Mr. Vigneau’s sentence.”). 
 188 See 423 F. Supp. 3d 345, 353 (S.D. Tex. 2019) (“For the Government to advocate that the 
Court issue an order that ‘would cause BOP to release the Defendant,’ is beyond what is usual, cus-
tomary, regular, or common. And given the Government’s position, irreparable harm and injustice 
would result if the Court failed to craft such an order.” (citations omitted)). In Cantu, the defendant 
had previously pled guilty to racketeering and drug offenses and was serving a 210-month sentence. 
Id. at 347. 
 189 See id. at 353 (discussing the prosecution’s agreement that the defendant should be released 
based on the defendant’s advanced age); 2018 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 11, § 1B1.13 cmt. 
n.1 (failing to provide an avenue for prosecutors to advocate for a defendant’s release under the com-
passionate release program). 
 190 See Cantu, 423 F. Supp. 3d at 351 (“[I]f the Director of the BOP were still the sole determiner 
of what constitutes an extraordinary and compelling reason, the amendment’s allowance of defend-
ants’ own § 3582(c)(1)(A) motions for reduction of sentence would be to no avail.”). 
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dinary and compelling reasons” justifying compassionate release under the 
First Step Act, broadening the number of inmates who may be eligible.191 
B. Compassion, Continued: Circuit Courts Join the Majority Position 
In September 2020, courts taking a broad approach toward compassionate 
release in the First Step era gained a major ally.192 The U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit in United States v. Brooker was the first circuit court to 
rule that the “extraordinary and compelling reasons” listed in the Guidelines 
Manual were neither exhaustive nor binding.193 The defendant, Jeremy Zullo, 
sought compassionate release based on his positive rehabilitative record, and 
what he contended was an unjustly long sentence.194 The trial court initially 
concluded that Zullo was ineligible for release because his reasons did not 
strictly fall into one of the three “extraordinary and compelling” categories 
listed in the Guidelines Manual.195 
                                                                                                                           
 191 See, e.g., United States v. Lisi, 440 F. Supp. 3d 246, 252 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (finding the defend-
ant’s role as sole available caregiver for his severely ill mother was “extraordinary and compelling”); 
United States v. Walker, No 11 CR 270, 2019 WL 5268752, at *2–3 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 17, 2019) (hold-
ing that the defendant, a veteran suffering from PTSD with a lengthy sentence, a perfect disciplinary 
record, and a terminally ill mother had “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for release); United 
States v. Bucci, 409 F. Supp. 3d 1, 2 (D. Mass. 2019) (granting compassionate release for a defendant 
who was the only capable caregiver for his parent, rather than a child or spouse); United States v. 
Cantu-Rivera, No. CR H-89-204, 2019 WL 2578272, at *2 (S.D. Tex. June 24, 2019) (concluding that 
an elderly defendant who had served thirty years of his sentence and had shown an “extraordinary 
degree of rehabilitation” therefore had “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for release). 
 192 See United States v. Brooker, 976 F.3d 228, 234 (2d Cir. 2020) (holding that the “extraordi-
nary and compelling [reasons]” listed in the Guidelines Manual were not exhaustive and were not 
applicable to district courts deciding compassionate release motions). 
 193 See id. at 236 (holding that the Guidelines Manual “cannot constrain district courts’ discre-
tion” in compassionate release matters). The district court had previously denied the defendant’s re-
quest, stating that the proffered “extraordinary and compelling” reason was not consistent with the 
compassionate release criteria in the Guidelines Manual. See id. at 234, 236 (noting that the district 
court denied Zullo’s motion by “relying on Guideline § 1B1.13, which seemingly still required a mo-
tion by the BOP”). 
 194 See id. at 238 (“Zullo does not rely solely on his (apparently extensive) rehabilitation. Zullo’s 
age at the time of his crime and the sentencing court’s statements about the injustice of his lengthy 
sentence might perhaps weigh in favor of a sentence reduction.”). The defendant was serving a man-
datory minimum fifteen-year sentence for drug trafficking and firearm offenses. Id. at 230. The de-
fendant was only seventeen at the time of his offense, and twenty-two at the time of his sentencing. Id. 
The judge presiding over the defendant’s sentence noted that, during a period of pre-trial release, he 
had expressed remorse for his actions and had begun taking steps toward rehabilitation, though the 
court did not elaborate on what those steps were. See id. at 230–31 (failing to discuss the defendant’s 
specific rehabilitative activities). Additionally, the court commented that at the time the sentencing 
judge expressed his remorse that the then-mandatory Sentencing Guidelines required a harsher sen-
tence than he would have otherwise imposed. Id. 
 195 See id. at 234 (recounting the district court’s denial of the motion because sentence harshness 
and extraordinary rehabilitation are not “extraordinary and compelling” reasons contemplated in the 
Guidelines Manual). 
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The Second Circuit remanded, holding that after the First Step Act, the 
Guidelines Manual no longer limited the reasons for which a court could grant 
compassionate release.196 The court ruled that the BOP Director’s approval of 
the “extraordinary and compelling reasons” underlying a compassionate re-
lease motion was no longer necessary.197 This was true even when the defend-
ant sought compassionate release for an “extraordinary and compelling reason” 
other than medical circumstances, family circumstances, or old age; only the 
independent discretion of a district judge was necessary to grant the motion.198 
In other words, because the Guidelines Manual was incompatible with the new 
compassionate release statute, it was inapplicable and therefore did not con-
strain a district judge’s discretion.199 The Second Circuit stated that the limita-
tions in the Guidelines Manual applied as they always had to motions brought 
by the BOP Director, but not to those brought directly by the inmate.200 As 
such, the guidance still effectively restrained the district court’s discretion.201 
Soon after, in 2020, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit mir-
rored this two-pronged approach in United States v. Jones.202 The Sixth Circuit 
echoed many of the policy rationales discussed in the Brooker opinion.203 In 
addition, the Sixth Circuit made explicit its aim to preserve as much of the 
                                                                                                                           
 196 See id. at 235 (holding that the removal of the BOP Director’s exclusive authority to bring 
compassionate release motions made the compassionate release criteria in the Guidelines Manual 
inapplicable, thus freeing up district courts to exercise their discretion). 
 197 See id. at 237 (concluding that the First Step Act allows district courts “to consider the full 
slate of extraordinary and compelling reasons” that might justify compassionate release, not merely 
those listed in the Guidelines Manual). 
 198 See id. (noting that the restrictions codified in the compassionate release statute are the only 
constraints on a judge deciding a compassionate release motion). 
 199 Id. 
 200 Id. at 236 (stating that the First Step Act and the Guidelines Manual can be logically recon-
ciled with one another when the BOP Director brings a motion). 
 201 See id. (“This reading not only saves as much of the existing Guideline as is possible, given 
the First Step Act, but it also aligns with Congress’ intent in passing that Act.”). The Government 
argued that the Guidelines Manual was severable. Id. In other words, the Government insisted that the 
court should remove any language from the Guideline that was inconsistent with the statute and faith-
fully apply whatever remained. See id. (“The government seeks to retain BOP power to define ex-
traordinary and compelling circumstances by urging us to sever the explicitly conflicting portions of 
the Guideline . . . .”). The court rejected this argument, concluding that trying to sever any part of the 
Guideline would contravene legislative intent to increase the use of compassionate release under the 
First Step Act. Id. at 236–37. 
 202 See 980 F.3d 1098, 1109 (6th Cir. 2020), abrogated by United States v. Navarro, 986 F.3d 668 
(6th Cir. 2021) (“We now join the majority of district courts and the Second Circuit in holding that the 
passage of the First Step Act rendered § 1B1.13 ‘inapplicable’ to cases where an imprisoned person 
files a motion for compassionate release.”). 
 203 See id. at 1108–11 (citing United States v. Brooker, 976 F.3d 228, 235–36 (2d Cir. 2020)) 
(noting the court’s decision to “follow[] the Second Circuit’s lead” in analyzing the compassionate 
release statute and applicable guidance). 
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Guidelines Manual as possible.204 The court explained that the Guidelines 
Manual restricted motions for compassionate release brought by the BOP Di-
rector, but not individual inmates.205 The court then discussed a district courts’ 
obligations to explain why it makes a given sentencing decision.206 Citing Su-
preme Court precedent on sentence modification, the Sixth Circuit emphasized 
not only the district courts’ obligations to explain, but appellate courts’ duty to 
review district court decisions for abuse of discretion, providing a check on 
district courts.207 
Later, in 2020 in United States v. Gunn, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit adopted the position of its sister circuits and emphasized that 
district court decisions on compassionate release were subject to appellate re-
view.208 Also in 2020, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit joined 
the Brooker camp in United States v. McCoy.209 In 2021, the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit followed suit in United States v. Aruda, followed by 
                                                                                                                           
 204 See id. at 1111 (“By following the Second Circuit’s lead, we weave together three compatible 
aspirations: preserving as much of § 1B1.13 that can be saved, adhering to Congress’s intent, and 
respecting the Sentencing Commission’s thoughtful authorship of § 1B1.13’s commentary.”). 
 205 Id. In 2020, in United States v. Ruffin, the Sixth Circuit addressed the question of the applica-
bility of the Guidelines Manual to compassionate release for the first time, but declined to rule on the 
issue at that time. See 978 F.3d 1000, 1008 (6th Cir. 2020) (“At day’s end, we need not (and do not) 
pick a side in this debate.”). The Ruffin court found that regardless of whether the defendant had 
properly proffered an “extraordinary and compelling reason[]” warranting compassionate release, the 
§ 3553(a) factors did not justify granting the motion. Id. The opinion provides a comprehensive sum-
mary of the debate over “extraordinary and compelling reasons,” and offers a robust collection of 
cases in both camps. See id. at 1006–08 (“It is easy to see why a conflict has emerged. For starters, 
courts have read the statutory text as cutting in both directions.”). 
 206 See Jones, 980 F.3d at 1112 (discussing the statutory requirements that judges state the ra-
tionale for sentencing decisions in open court). 
 207 Id.; see, e.g., Chavez-Meza v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1959, 1963 (2018) (articulating that 
district courts have an “obligation to provide reasons” in sentencing modification decisions); High-
mark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 572 U.S. 559, 563 n.2 (2014) (holding that appellate 
courts are permitted to correct legal or factual errors if a district court’s decision hinged on the district 
court’s discretion); Martin v. Franklin Cap. Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 139 (2005) (“Discretion is not whim 
. . . .”). The Sixth Circuit outlined three explanations that a district court must make on the record 
when ruling on a motion for compassionate release: (1) why the circumstances given are extraordinary 
and compelling, (2) why the extraordinary and compelling circumstance comport with requirements in 
the compassionate release statute and policy statements, and (3) how the § 3553(a) factors weigh in 
favor of release. See Jones, 980 F.3d at 1112–14 (discussing how thoughtful explanations from the 
judiciary reflect sound decision-making and improve public trust). 
 208 980 F.3d 1178, 1180–81 (7th Cir. 2020). The defendant in Gunn was charged with drug and 
firearms offenses. Id. at 1179. She sought compassionate release based on her advanced age and sus-
ceptibility to COVID-19. Id. 
 209 981 F.3d 271, 281 (4th Cir. 2020) (holding that district judges are bound only by statutory 
criteria when determining whether to grant compassionate release, and that the Sentencing Guidelines 
criteria do not apply to motions for compassionate release brought directly by a defendant). McCoy 
dealt with the consolidated appeals of defendants convicted of robbery and firearms offenses who 
faced an additional twenty-five year sentence due to the “stacking” provision of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). 
Id. at 274. The defendants sought compassionate release based on amendments to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), 
which provided for a lesser sentence. Id. 
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the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in United States 
v. Long, and lastly, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in United 
States v. Andrews.210 
Two other circuits initially hesitated to align with the Second Circuit’s 
holding in Brooker, but later changed course to join the Brooker camp.211 In 
March 2020, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit ruled in United 
States v. Saldana that post-sentencing developments in sentencing law are not 
an “extraordinary and compelling reason” warranting compassionate release, 
as such a reason was not explicitly written into the Guidelines Manual.212 A 
                                                                                                                           
 210 See United States v. Andrews, No. 20-2768, 2021 WL 3852617, at *3 (3d Cir. Aug. 30, 2021) 
(agreeing with the Brooker court and sister circuits that have adopted the Brooker position based on a 
similar interpretation of the new compassionate release statute); United States v. Long, 997 F.3d 342, 
355 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (adopting the Brooker position to allow district courts to exercise discretion 
unconstrainted by the Guidelines Manual in compassionate release decisions); United States v. Aruda, 
993 F.3d 797, 801–02 (9th Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (holding similarly to Brooker and other circuits on 
the discretion afforded to district court judges on compassionate release motions). In Aruda, the de-
fendant was serving a 130-month sentence after pleading guilty to drug charges. Aruda, 993 F.3d at 
798. The defendant asserted that her hypothyroidism and other physical conditions made her more 
susceptible COVID-19. Id. The defendant proffered this concern as an “‘extraordinary and compel-
ling’ reason[]” warranting compassionate release. Id. The district court denied the defendant’s motion, 
finding that the criteria in the Guidelines Manual were binding and the reason provided did not fit any 
of the categories. Id. at 799. The Ninth Circuit vacated and remanded the case to the lower court to be 
reassessed without the constraints of the Guidelines Manual, holding that the Manual was no longer 
binding on the district court. Id. at 802. The defendant in Long had served thirteen years of a twenty-
nine-year sentence for drug and racketeering charges and moved for compassionate release based on 
his susceptibility to contracting COVID-19 because of several debilitating medical conditions. Long, 
997 F.3d at 349. The district court denied the defendant’s motion. Id. The district court had assumed, 
for the sake of argument, that the defendant had presented “an ‘extraordinary and compelling rea-
son,’” but denied the defendant’s motion on the grounds that the defendant was a danger to the com-
munity. Id. at 350. The D.C. Circuit did not rule on the merits of the defendant’s claim or whether 
susceptibility to COVID-19 constituted an “extraordinary and compelling” reason but remanded to the 
lower court with the instruction that § 1B1.13 of the Sentencing Guidelines did not apply to the de-
fendant’s motion. Id. at 361. Finally, the defendant in Andrews was convicted of armed robbery and 
sentenced to 312 years. Andrews, 2021 WL 3852617, at *1. The defendant sought compassionate 
release based on changes to the stacking provision in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), which would have resulted 
in a lighter sentence for the defendant. Id. The district court had originally denied the defendant’s 
motion on the grounds that he had failed to provide an “extraordinary and compelling reason[].” Id. 
 211 See United States v. McGee, 992 F.3d 1035, 1050 (10th Cir. 2021) (“We conclude . . . , as 
have the Second, Fourth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits, that the Sentencing Commission’s existing 
policy statement is applicable only to motions for sentence reductions filed by the Director of the 
BOP, and not to motions filed directly by defendants.”); United States v. Shkambi, 993 F.3d 388, 393 
(5th Cir. 2021) (“[W]e conclude that neither the policy statement nor the commentary to it binds a 
district court addressing a prisoner’s own motion under § 3582.”); United States v. Bell, 823 F. App’x 
283, 284 (5th Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (hesitating to depart from the compassionate release criteria in 
the Guidelines Manual); United States v. Saldana, 807 F. App’x 816, 819–20 (10th Cir. 2020) (imply-
ing that the compassionate release criteria in the Guidelines Manual is still binding, but declining to 
provide an explicit ruling on the issue). 
 212 See 807 F. App’x at 819–20 (holding that retroactive sentencing relief must come from Con-
gress); 2018 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 11, § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1 (failing to list post-sentencing 
changes in sentencing law as an “extraordinary and compelling reason[]” warranting compassionate 
2021] Compassionate Release After the First Step Act 2497 
year later, in March 2021, the Tenth Circuit changed course in United States v. 
McGee, concluding that a district court could properly consider post-
conviction changes in sentencing law as an “extraordinary and compelling” 
circumstance for release.213 
Similarly, in September 2020, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit, in United States v. Bell, implied that the Guidelines Manual and its list of 
“extraordinary and compelling reason[s]” was exhaustive and binding.214 In 
April 2021, however, in United States v. Shkambi the Fifth Circuit changed 
course to align with Brooker.215 In that case, the Fifth Circuit vacated and re-
                                                                                                                           
release); BOP PROGRAM STATEMENT 5050.50, supra note 10, at 1–2 (discussing compassionate re-
lease only with regard to the “extraordinary and compelling reasons” listed in the Guidelines Manual). 
But see United States v. Maumau, No. 08-CR-00758-11, 2020 WL 806121, at *7 (D. Utah Feb. 18, 
2020) (holding post-conviction changes in sentencing law could be an “extraordinary and compelling 
reason” to reduce a defendant’s sentence). In Saldana, the defendant had pled guilty to federal drug 
trafficking and firearms offenses. Saldana, 807 F. App’x at 817. He received a forty-six-month sen-
tence, followed by a consecutive sixty-month sentence, and three years of supervised release. Id. at 
818. The defendant’s prior state law conviction for assault of a police officer triggered a higher Guide-
lines sentence. Id. The defendant sought review of his sentence after the relevant state law recatego-
rized his prior conviction. Id. The defendant argued that, had he been sentenced today, the recategori-
zation would not have triggered a higher Guidelines sentence range. Id. 
 213 See 992 F.3d at 1047, 1050 (adopting the interpretation set forth in Brooker and subsequent 
decisions by other circuits). The defendant in McGee was serving a mandatory life sentence for feder-
al drug charges, triggered by his prior state law drug convictions. Id. The defendant sought compas-
sionate release because the federal and state laws under which he was convicted were amended to 
provide for less harsh punishments, in addition to his exemplary rehabilitative record. Id. at 1039–40. 
 214 See 823 F. App’x at 284 (noting that the Guidelines Manual suggests that its list of “extraordi-
nary and compelling reason[s]” justifying compassionate release are exhaustive); 2018 GUIDELINES 
MANUAL, supra note 11, § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1 (setting forth a list of “extraordinary and compelling rea-
sons” warranting compassionate release). The defendant in Bell was serving a 240-month federal 
sentence consecutively with several state prison sentences, although the opinion does not make clear 
for what crimes. See Bell, 823 F. App’x at 284 (failing to discuss the defendant’s criminal history). In 
addition to the harshness of his sentence, the defendant claimed that his guilty plea was not voluntary. 
Id. The court concluded that the harsh sentence and the defendant’s misgivings about the plea process 
together did not constitute “an extraordinary and compelling reason” warranting compassionate re-
lease. Id. The Fifth Circuit exhibited similar hesitance in its January 2021 decision in United States v. 
Thompson. See 984 F.3d 431, 434 (5th Cir. 2021), cert. denied Thompson v. United States, 210 L. Ed. 
2d 843 (U.S. 2021) (“Although not dispositive, the commentary to . . . [the Sentencing Guidelines] 
§ 1B1.13 informs our analysis . . . .”). In Thompson, the court discussed a defendant seeking compas-
sionate release on the grounds that he had an increased risk of contracting COVID-19 due to underly-
ing medical conditions. Id. at 433. Unlike some district courts, the Fifth Circuit was not convinced 
that increased risk of contracting COVID-19 qualified as “extraordinary.” Compare Thompson, 984 
F.3d at 434 (holding that increased susceptibility to COVID-19 because of hypertension and high-
cholesterol is not “extraordinary”), with United States v. Rodriguez, 451 F. Supp. 3d 392, 400–01 
(E.D. Pa. 2020) (holding that increased susceptibility to COVID-19 does qualify as an “extraordinary 
and compelling reason[]”). 
 215 See 993 F.3d 388, 392–93 (5th Cir. 2021) (holding that after the First Step Act’s enactment, 
district courts were free to consider any “extraordinary and compelling reason[]” justifying compas-
sionate release within statutory limits). The Fifth Circuit’s opinion in Shkambi did not explicitly list 
the crimes for which the defendant had been imprisoned, nor the length of his sentence, but it did note 
that the defendant sought compassionate release based on health complications that made him more 
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manded the lower court’s denial of the defendant’s compassionate release mo-
tion, noting that the lower court was no longer bound by the criteria in the 
Guidelines Manual.216 With this change of heart from the Fifth and Tenth Cir-
cuits, nine circuits in total support the Brooker position, setting aside the 
Guideline Manual’s limitations on compassionate release as applied to inmates 
pursuing motions on their own behalf.217 
C. Consistency: Many District Judges Hesitate to Broaden  
Compassionate Release Criteria 
The entire federal judiciary is not keen, however, to exercise broad discre-
tion in compassionate release matters.218 A minority of district courts are hesi-
tant to find “extraordinary and compelling” circumstances beyond the three 
reasons explicitly listed in the Guidelines Manual: medical circumstances, 
family circumstances, or old age.219 Some courts in the minority camp have 
denied motions for compassionate release for circumstances where other courts 
                                                                                                                           
susceptible to contracting COVID-19. See id. at 389 (failing to recount the defendant’s criminal histo-
ry). 
 216 See id. 391–92 (identifying mass incarceration as a major rationale underlying the First Step 
Act’s amendments to the compassionate release system and concluding that the First Step Act allows 
district courts to consider “extraordinary and compelling reasons” justifying compassionate release 
other than those in the Guidelines Manual to effectuate Congress’s intent to address mass incarcera-
tion). 
 217 United States v. Andrews, No. 20-2768, 2021 WL 3852617, at *3 (3d Cir. Aug. 30, 2021); 
United States v. Long, 997 F.3d 342, 355 (D.C. Cir. 2021); United States v. Aruda, 993 F.3d 797, 
801–02 (9th Cir. 2021) (per curiam); Shkambi, 993 F.3d at 393; McGee, 992 F.3d at 1050; United 
States v. McCoy, 981 F.3d 271, 280–82 (4th Cir. 2020); United States v. Jones, 980 F.3d 1098, 1109 
(6th Cir. 2020), abrogated by United States v. Navarro, 986 F.3d 668 (6th Cir. 2021); United States v. 
Gunn, 980 F.3d 1178, 1181 (7th Cir. 2020); United States v. Brooker, 976 F.3d 228, 234 (2d Cir. 
2020). 
 218 See, e.g., United States v. Holley, No. 96-CR-00208-SGC-1, 2021 WL 2867032 (N.D. Ala. 
July 8, 2021) (denying a motion for compassionate release because a defendant’s health concerns did 
not strictly comply with Guidelines Manual); United States v. Conyers, No. 12-CR-016, 2020 WL 
7480695, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 18, 2020) (holding that the Guidelines Manual policy statement pro-
vides an exclusive list of “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for compassionate release); United 
States v. Brummett, No. 07-103, 2020 WL 6120457, at *1 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 16, 2020) (characterizing 
district courts granting compassionate release for reasons not specifically articulated in the Guidelines 
Manual as an encroachment on the power of the Sentencing Commission). 
 219 See 2018 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 11, § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1 (setting forth only medical 
circumstances, family circumstances, and old age as explicit circumstances which constitute “extraor-
dinary and compelling reasons” warranting compassionate release); see also United States v. White, 
No. 95-cr-179-Orl-22DCI, 2021 WL 2784325, at *3 (M.D. Fla. July 2, 2021) (denying a motion for 
compassionate release because post-conviction changes in sentencing law are not an “extraordinary 
and compelling circumstance[]” in the Guidelines Manual); United States v. Lynn, No. CR 89-0072, 
2019 WL 3805349, at *1–2 (S.D. Ala Aug. 13, 2019), appeal dismissed, No. 19-13239-F, 2019 WL 
6273393 (11th Cir. Oct. 8, 2019) (finding that the Guidelines Manual’s list of “extraordinary and 
compelling reasons” warranting compassionate release is exhaustive). 
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had granted release on nearly identical facts.220 Courts which have adopted this 
position are reluctant to grant compassionate release for novel reasons until the 
Sentencing Commission updates the Guidelines Manual.221 
This minority view asserts that the First Step Act is merely a procedural 
change to the compassionate release procedure, not a substantive change of 
compassionate release criteria.222 In other words, the changes made by the First 
Step Act merely allow people other than the BOP Director to file compassion-
ate release motions.223 An early adopter of this position was the U.S. District 
Court for the Southern District of Alabama in the 2020 case United States v. 
Lynn.224 In Lynn, the defendant asserted that his numerous health issues consti-
tuted “extraordinary and compelling reasons” warranting compassionate re-
lease.225 The court disagreed with the Southern District of Texas’s ruling on 
similar facts in United States v. Cantu.226 According to the Lynn court, it is im-
proper to interpret inmates’ newfound capability to bring their own compas-
sionate release motions as a substantive change in the law dictating when 
compassionate release is appropriate.227 
Another minority opinion is notable for its author: Judge Danny C. 
Reeves, who previously sat on the Sentencing Commission.228 In 2020, in 
                                                                                                                           
 220 Compare United States v. Vigneau, 473 F. Supp. 3d 31, 36–38 (D.R.I. 2020) (holding that 
changing sentencing regimes resulting in lighter sentences may be an “extraordinary and compelling 
reason[]” for granting compassionate release to an inmate sentenced under the old regime), with Unit-
ed States v. Arojojoye, 806 F. App’x 475, 477–78 (7th Cir. 2020) (characterizing the argument that 
sentencing reform could constitute a “‘compelling and extraordinary’ circumstance” as “dubious”). 
 221 See Brummett, 2020 WL 6120457, at *2 (“Until directed otherwise, this Court will continue to 
rely on Section 1B1.13 to determine whether a defendant has offered ‘extraordinary and compelling 
reasons’ to justify release.”). 
 222 See Conyers, 2020 WL 7480695, at *4 (“[W]hile the First Step Act expanded prisoners’ ac-
cess to the courts to file compassionate-release motions under Section 3582(c)(1)(A), it did not alter 
the substantive standards governing such motions.”). 
 223 See id. (characterizing the new capability of inmates to bring their own compassionate release 
motions as the expansion of compassionate release that Congress intended). 
 224 See No. CR 89-0072, 2019 WL 3805349, at *2 (S.D. Ala. Aug. 13, 2019), appeal dismissed, 
No. 19-13239-F, 2019 WL 6273393 (11th Cir. Oct. 8, 2019) (interpreting the compassionate release 
statute as amended by the First Step Act to effect no changes to the compassionate release criteria). 
 225 See Lynn, 2019 WL 3805349, at * 1 (indicating that the defendant had a number of kidney and 
cardiovascular problems that were the basis of his motion). 
 226 See id. at *3–4 (acknowledging and recounting the rationale in the Cantu decision but finding 
“no comparable inherent incompatibility” between the amended compassionate release statute and the 
guidance in the Guidelines Manual, concluding that the Guidelines remain binding); United States v. 
Cantu, 423 F. Supp. 3d 345, 353 (S.D. Tex. 2019) (granting compassionate release to a defendant with 
numerous health issues which made the defendant more susceptible to COVID-19). 
 227 See Lynn, 2019 WL 3805349, at *2–4 (“The only change to this section made by the Act was 
to allow a defendant to file a compassionate release motion under certain circumstances.”). 
 228 See United States v. Brummett, No. 07-103, 2020 WL 6120457, at *1 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 16, 2020) 
(declining to find that the compassionate release criteria in the Guidelines Manual are no longer binding). 
Judge Reeves appears to have left the Sentencing Commission at some point in early 2021, as he is no 
longer listed as an active Commissioner on the Sentencing Commission’s website. Former Commission-
er Information, U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, https://www.ussc.gov/about/who-we-are/commisioners/former-
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United States v. Brummett, a defendant in the U.S. District Court for the East-
ern District of Kentucky moved for compassionate release on the grounds that 
he had an increased risk of contracting COVID-19.229 The court denied the 
defendant’s request for want of an “extraordinary and compelling” circum-
stance consistent with the Guidelines Manual.230 The Brummett court openly 
disagreed with the Brooker holding, stating that the Brooker viewpoint allows 
the judiciary to usurp the Sentencing Commission’s right to define “extraordi-
nary and compelling reasons.”231 Brummett, in contrast to Brooker, concludes 
that district courts cannot grant compassionate release for novel reasons until 
the Sentencing Commission updates the Guidelines Manual, regardless of 
whether the Guidelines Manual is fairly applicable to compassionate release 
motions brought by inmates.232 
D. Consistency, Continued: The U.S. Court of Appeals for the  
Eleventh Circuit Supports the Minority Position 
To date, only one circuit court has adopted the minority position that the 
Guidelines Manual’s compassionate release criteria remain binding on district 
court judges’ ability to decide motions for compassionate release, regardless of 
who brings the motion.233 In October 2020, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit, in United States v. Monaco, denied a motion for compassion-
ate release, reluctant to expand compassionate release criteria.234 Although the 
                                                                                                                           
commissioner-information [https://perma.cc/SZJ6-M24G]. Judge Reeves, however, was still an active 
Commissioner when the Brummett opinion was written in October 2020. Id. 
 229 2020 WL 6120457, at *1. 
 230 See id. at *2 (“[T]he Court declines to expand the definition of ‘extraordinary and compelling’ 
broadly enough to include the risk of a future illness. Brummett’s motion will be denied on the mer-
its.”). 
 231 See id. (“Brummett argues that the definitions in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 do not apply to compas-
sionate-release motions brough [sic] directly by defendants. And some courts have made this determi-
nation . . . . [T]his Court will continue to rely on Section 1B1.13 . . . .” (citations omitted)); see 
Brooker, 976 F.3d at 234 (discussing the inapplicability of the Sentencing Guidelines to compassion-
ate release motions brought directly by defendants, in opposition to the Brummett ruling). 
 232 See Brummett, 2020 WL 6120457, at *2 (noting the court’s reluctance to depart from the 
compassionate release criteria provided in the Sentencing Guidelines until and unless the Sentencing 
Commission provides a new policy statement). Interestingly, Brummett may be moot following a 
contrary holding by the Sixth Circuit in 2020 in United States v. Jones. See 980 F.3d 1098, 1109 (6th 
Cir. 2020), abrogated by United States v. Navarro, 986 F.3d 668 (6th Cir. 2021) (holding that the 
Sentencing Guidelines do not limit a district court’s discretion to find an “‘extraordinary and compel-
ling’ reason” for compassionate release). The ruling in Jones enshrined the majority position as law in 
the Sixth Circuit, which includes the Eastern District of Kentucky. See id. (declining to address 
Brummett directly, but reaching the opposite conclusion). 
 233 See United States v. Bryant, 996 F.3d 1243, 1247 (11th Cir. 2021) (“The [First Step Act] does 
not affect the [compassionate release] statute’s or 1B1.13’s substantive standards, specifically the 
definition of ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons.’”). 
 234 See 832 F. App’x 623, 629–30 (11th Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (denying a motion for compas-
sionate release because the defendant’s proffered reasons did not strictly fit into the Guidelines Manu-
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court did not explicitly rule on the issue, it implied that, even after the First 
Step Act, the Guidelines Manual’s restrictions remained binding on motions 
for compassionate release because the task of defining “extraordinary and 
compelling reasons” traditionally fell to the Sentencing Commission, not the 
courts.235 
Full endorsement of the minority position came in May 2021 in United 
States v. Bryant, when the Eleventh Circuit held that the First Step Act’s allow-
ance of defendant-filed compassionate release motions represented only a pro-
cedural change to compassionate release, leaving substantive criteria un-
changed.236 The defendant in Bryant sought compassionate released based on 
changes in sentencing law and his positive rehabilitative record.237 The court 
held that because the Guidelines Manual was still “capable of being applied” 
to post-First Step Act motions for compassionate release, the Manual was, by 
dictionary definition, applicable to all motions for compassionate release.238 
The court stated that the broader role of the Guidelines Manual in the federal 
criminal justice system weighed in favor of greater restraint on judicial deci-
sion-making.239 This decision, the court concluded, was in keeping with the 
                                                                                                                           
al criteria). The defendant in Monaco was sentenced to 660 months for ten counts of assorted drug 
trafficking and firearms charges. Id. at 627. The defendant put forth his advanced age, long sentence, 
and rehabilitative record as “an extraordinary and compelling reason” for his release. Id. at 629–30. 
The Eleventh Circuit assessed the defendant’s claim against only the old age criteria written out in the 
Manual, declining to invoke the “catch-all” provision. Id. Finding the defendant did not meet the crite-
ria for compassionate release based on old age, the Eleventh Circuit upheld the lower court’s denial of 
the motion. See id. (failing to discuss compassionate release criteria other than old age). 
 235 Id. Although the absence of “an extraordinary and compelling reason” was sufficient to end 
the analysis, the Eleventh Circuit opted to further explain that the § 3553(a) factors weighed heavily 
against the defendant’s release, regardless of whether he had proven the existence of “an extraordinary 
and compelling circumstance.” See id. at 630 (noting that the severity of the defendant’s crimes war-
ranted a longer sentence). In addition to his firearms and drug charges, the defendant had also at-
tempted to solicit the murders of several people, including a federal prosecutor. Id. at 627. Even so, 
other courts have acknowledged that the § 3553(a) factors can counsel against granting release despite 
the presence of “an extraordinary and compelling” circumstances. See United States v. Chambliss, 948 
F.3d 691, 693–94 (5th Cir. 2020) (denying compassionate release based on the § 3553(a) factors de-
spite the presence of “an extraordinary and compelling reason”). 
 236 See 996 F.3d 1243, 1247 (11th Cir. 2021) (holding that the First Step Act allowed defendants 
to file their own compassionate release motions, but because it contained no text exactly on point, it 
did not amend the substantive criteria for compassionate release). 
 237 Id. at 1250–51. The defendant in Bryant was a police officer who utilized his position to traffic 
drugs and stolen weapons. Id. at 1248. After his conviction, the district court sentenced the defendant 
to 292-months, followed by a consecutive 300-month sentence, bringing his sentence to a total of 
almost fifty years. Id. 
 238 Id. at 1252–53 (citing Applicable, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 23). The court also 
relied on a second dictionary definition of “applicable”—defined as “‘relating to’ or ‘relevant’”—to 
find that the Guidelines Manual remained “relevant” to the compassionate release statute, and thus 
could be properly applied to implement the statute. Id.  
 239 Id. at 1255–56. In other words, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that it is preferable to retain 
some policy statement or administrative guidance to orient the implementation of a criminal justice 
statute, rather than leaving no guidance at all. See id. at 1257 (collecting cases discussing the Sentenc-
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historic goal of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 and the Sen-
tencing Guidelines: consistency in sentencing.240 
The Eleventh Circuit ended by criticizing the Brooker position on two 
grounds.241 First, the court noted that any mention of motions by the BOP Di-
rector served only a “prefatory” role in the Guidelines Manual, rather than an 
operative one.242 Said another way, the Eleventh Circuit stated that it was im-
proper to discount the Guidelines Manual merely because its text still refers to 
the old compassionate release system.243 Second, the Eleventh Circuit asserted 
that courts in the majority camp were legislating from the bench by creating 
new circumstances for compassionate release.244 The Brooker camp, in the 
Eleventh Circuit’s view, improperly speculated what the Sentencing Commis-
sion and Congress might do rather than waiting for legislation.245 
One judge on the Bryant court dissented, echoing the Brooker camp’s ex-
planation of why the Guidelines Manual is no longer applicable to motions for 
compassionate release.246 The dissent criticized the majority’s interpretation as 
an unlawful delegation of Sentencing Commission authority to the BOP, argu-
ing that that interpretation empowers the BOP, without authorization from 
Congress, to limit the possible circumstances that could justify granting com-
                                                                                                                           
ing Commission’s role in promoting consistency in the federal criminal justice system by providing 
uniform guidance on sentencing matters). 
 240 See id. at 1256–57 (identifying sentencing consistency, the main historic rationale behind the 
creation of the Sentencing Commission and the Sentencing Guidelines, as a motivating interest for the 
decision). 
 241 See id. (acknowledging the Brooker position as originally articulated by the Second Circuit, 
and similar subsequent opinions from other circuits). 
 242 See id. at 1260 (“The prefatory part of the policy statement orients the reader by paraphrasing 
the statute as it existed at the time the policy statement was enacted. But the important operative pro-
visions of the policy statement are found in the application notes.” (emphasis added)). A prefatory 
statement is an introduction that helps orient a reader and provides scope and purpose. Preface, DICI-
TONARY.COM, https://www.dictionary.com/browse/preface [https://perma.cc/X5PA-A3RD]. An op-
erative provision has some legal force or effect. Operative, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 
23. 
 243 See Bryant, 996 F.3d at 1260 (criticizing courts in the Brooker camp for usurping the role of 
the Sentencing Commission imputing an operative meaning to the mention of motions brought by the 
BOP Director in the Guidelines Manual). 
 244 See id. at 1261 (criticizing the courts in the Brooker camp’s “purposivist”—or intention-
driven—approach for infringing upon the powers of the executive and legislative branches). The 
Eleventh Circuit, in other words, favors an interpretation of the compassionate release statute and the 
Guidelines Manual that preserves the status quo until the Sentencing Commission updates the Guide-
lines Manual, even though the update process can take several months, if not years. See id. (discussing 
the “lag time between a statutory change and guideline amendments” that prevent new Guidelines 
from taking immediate effect). 
 245 See id. (“[I]t is not our role to predict what the Sentencing Commission will do or what Con-
gress wants it to do. Our role is to interpret the relevant legal texts and apply them as they exist.”). 
 246 See id. at 1268–69 (Martin, J., dissenting) (performing a textualist analysis of the guidance in 
the Guidelines Manual to conclude that, by its own terms, the compassionate release criteria in the 
Guidelines Manual can only be applied to motions filed by the BOP Director, not to motions filed 
directly by defendants). 
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passionate release.247 Finally, the dissent denounced the majority’s focus on the 
rationale underlying the 1984 CCCA to the detriment of the more recent First 
Step Act.248 Though divided, the Eleventh Circuit remains the only federal ap-
pellate court that subscribes to this narrower interpretation of the First Step 
Act.249 
III. EFFECTUATING CONGRESSIONAL INTENT BY CONTINUING  
TO EXPAND THE USE OF COMPASSIONATE RELEASE 
The combined forces of the First Step Act and the COVID-19 pandemic 
have thrust compassionate release into the spotlight.250 Regrettably, this has 
sown division among federal courts about how to interpret now out-of-date and 
inconsistent administrative guidance on what constitutes “extraordinary and 
compelling” circumstances.251 The resolution to this interpretive confusion, 
however, is straightforward.252 Congress’s explicit motivation for passing the 
First Step Act provides plenty of guidance for future action in all three branch-
                                                                                                                           
 247 See id. at 1272 (“[R]eading the Application Note in line with the majority’s interpretation, 
BOP is suddenly empowered to significantly restrain the universe of available ‘other reasons’ for 
defendants seeking compassionate release on their own behalf.” (emphasis omitted)). If Congress 
delegates certain powers and authority to a government agency, it is unlawful for that agency to in 
turn “sub-delegat[e]” that power to another agency. See id. (citing Bayou Lawn & Landscape Servs. v. 
Sec’y of Labor, 713 F.3d 1080, 1084–85 (11th Cir. 2013)) (explaining the process by which Congress 
can lawfully empower executive agencies with certain duties and capabilities). 
 248 Id. at 1272–73. After United States v. Long, the D.C. Circuit expressed strong agreement with 
the dissent in Bryant. See 997 F.3d 342, 358 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (citing approvingly to Judge Martin’s 
dissent). 
 249 See Bryant, 996 F. 3d at 1247 (declining to adopt an interpretation of the First Step Act that 
would enable district courts to exercise wider discretion in compassionate release decisions); id. at 
1272 (Martin, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the majority opinion); see also Long, 997 F.3d at 358 
(noting that all other circuits that have decided the issue disagree with the Eleventh Circuit). 
 250 See United States v. Jones, 980 F.3d 1098, 1100 n.1 (6th Cir. 2020), abrogated by United 
States v. Navarro, 986 F.3d 668 (6th Cir. 2021) (citing Keri Blakinger & Joseph Neff, Thousands of 
Sick Federal Prisoners Sought Compassionate Release. 98 Percent Were Denied., THE MARSHALL 
PROJECT (Oct. 7, 2020), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/10/07/thousands-of-sick-federal-
prisoners-sought-compassionate-release-98-percent-were-denied [https://perma.cc/7ZS9-MMPW]) 
(confirming that the COVID-19 pandemic drove an increase in compassionate release motions). 
 251 Compare United States v. Brooker, 976 F.3d 228, 234 (2d Cir. 2020) (concluding that the First 
Step Act allows judges to consider a wider array of “extraordinary and compelling” circumstances to 
grant compassionate release), with United States v. Bryant, 996 F.3d 1243, 1247 (11th Cir. 2021) 
(holding that the First Step Act’s procedural changes did not affect substantive criteria of the Guide-
lines Manual for compassionate release). 
 252 See 28 U.S.C. § 994(t) (authorizing the Sentencing Commission to promulgate new Sentenc-
ing Guidelines); Formerly Incarcerated Reenter Society Transformed Safely Transitioning Every 
Person (First Step) Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 603(b), 132 Stat. 5194, 5239–41 (codified in 
scattered sections of 18 and 34 U.S.C.) (indicating Congressional intent to increase the use of compas-
sionate release in the federal criminal justice system); Brooker, 976 F.3d at 235 (highlighting the im-
portance of wide judicial discretion for district judges deciding on motions for compassionate release). 
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es of the federal government.253 Section A of this Part advocates for all federal 
courts to join the majority position, accepting that the First Step Act empow-
ered district courts to exercise wide discretion to grant compassionate release 
motions.254 Section B cautions against future action by the Sentencing Com-
mission that may encroach upon this discretion, noting that such action would 
subvert the goals of the First Step Act.255 
A. The Short-Term Fix: Courts Should Continue to Follow the  
Brooker Approach to Compassionate Release 
The most obvious fix for the inconsistency between the compassionate re-
lease statute as amended by the First Step Act and the Guidelines Manual is for 
the Sentencing Commission to issue an updated Guidelines Manual.256 This is 
an obvious fix, but not an expedient one, because the Sentencing Commission 
is effectively paralyzed until the President nominates and the Senate confirms 
at least three voting members, allowing the Commission to have a quorum.257 
Even after the nomination process, newly appointed Commissioners may lock 
horns over amendments to a new Guidelines Manual.258 If the new Commis-
sioners were to submit an amended Guidelines Manual to Congress, there is a 
statutory lag time of six months before the amended Manual becomes effec-
tive.259 Therefore, although a new Guidelines Manual is critical as a long-term 
solution, a quicker fix is necessary until then.260 
                                                                                                                           
 253 See First Step Act § 603(b) (indicating congressional intent to increase the use of compassion-
ate release in the federal criminal justice system); JAMES, THE FIRST STEP ACT, supra note 119, at 1 
(summarizing Congress’s intent to overhaul the federal criminal justice system and address mass in-
carceration). 
 254 See infra notes 256–290 and accompanying text. 
 255 See infra notes 291–317 and accompanying text. 
 256 See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (stating that district courts cannot grant compassionate release 
for reasons inconsistent with applicable provisions in the Guidelines Manual); 28 U.S.C. § 994(t) 
(setting forth the Sentencing Commission’s authority to promulgate new Sentencing Guidelines, 
which could reflect the more expansive post-First Step Act statutory framework). 
 257 See 28 U.S.C. § 995(d) (mandating that the Sentencing Commission cannot promulgate new 
Guidelines without the presence of at least four voting members); United States v. Bryant, 996 F.3d 
1243, 1261 (11th Cir. 2021) (discussing “lag time between” the issuance of Guidelines, and the time 
at which the new Guidelines actually take effect); About the Commissioners, supra note 145 (listing 
Judge Charles Breyer as the only active voting member of the Sentencing Commission). Currently, 
the Biden Administration has not announced any nominations to fill the vacancies on the Commission. 
Stewart Bishop, Wide-Open Sentencing Commission Gives Biden Reform Path, LAW360 (Jan. 21, 
2021), https://www.law360.com/articles/1347291/wide-open-sentencing-commission-gives-biden-
reform-path [https://perma.cc/9HNC-T6YS]. 
 258 See 28 U.S.C. § 995(a) (requiring that a majority of Commissioners agree to any changes to 
the Guidelines Manual). 
 259 See 28 U.S.C. § 994(p) (setting out the process by which Guidelines Manual amendments 
become effective, including a delay period); Bryant, 996 F.3d at 1261 (citing Dorsey v. United States, 
567 U.S. 260, 293 n.2 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting)) (noting a six-month delay between the time 
when the Sentencing Commission promulgates Guidelines Manual amendments and the time those 
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In the meantime, federal courts considering compassionate release mo-
tions should follow the dominant Brooker approach; exercising broad discre-
tion to determine what constitutes an “extraordinary and compelling rea-
son[].”261 A major motivation for Congress’s passage of the First Step Act was 
reducing the federal prison population.262 It makes little sense for Congress to 
enact legislation intended to improve access to compassionate release only for 
courts to block that access because of antiquated Guideline language.263 Fur-
ther, as many judges in support of this position have stated, the compassionate 
release provisions in the First Step Act were a direct response to the BOP’s 
gross under-utilization of this mechanism.264 Even the title of the applicable 
                                                                                                                           
amendments become effective). Exacerbating the issue of timing is the fact that the Sentencing Com-
mission, by statute, can only submit an amended Manual to Congress between the beginning of a 
regular Congressional session—typically a day in the first week of January—and the first day of May. 
Id. During this time, Congress is free to offer modifications or its disapproval. Stinson v. United 
States, 508 U.S. 36, 40 (1993). 
 260 See United States v. Gunn, 980 F.3d 1178, 1181 (7th Cir. 2020) (“[W]e hope that the Sentenc-
ing Commission’s ability to revise its guidelines and policy statements will be restored by the ap-
pointment of additional members.”); United States v. Brooker, 976 F.3d 228, 234 (2d Cir. 2020) (not-
ing that the Sentencing Commission has too few members to achieve a quorum); United States v. 
Brummett, No. 07-103, 2020 WL 6120457, at *2 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 16, 2020) (“Until directed otherwise, 
this Court will continue to rely on Section 1B1.13 to determine whether a defendant has offered ‘ex-
traordinary and compelling reasons’ to justify release.”). 
 261 See Brooker, 976 F.3d at 235 (emphasis omitted) (determining that allowing courts to exercise 
greater discretion in deciding compassionate release motions aligns with the congressional intent 
behind the First Step Act); see also United States v. Jones, 980 F.3d 1098, 1110 (6th Cir. 2020), abro-
gated by United States v. Navarro, 986 F.3d 668 (6th Cir. 2021) (collecting legislative materials that 
indicate congressional intent to increase the use of compassionate release). 
 262 See Brooker, 976 F.3d at 236 (discussing how, especially after the 2013 DOJ OIG Memo, 
Congress was motivated by the BOP’s consistent failure to bring compassionate release motions to 
sentencing courts when amending the federal compassionate release system with the First Step Act); 
DOJ OIG 2013 COMPASSIONATE RELEASE MEMO, supra note 16, at 27–28 (providing specific data on 
the BOP’s failure to bring compassionate release motions to sentencing courts); JAMES, THE FIRST 
STEP ACT, supra note 119, at 1 (noting congressional intent to increase use of the compassionate re-
lease mechanism); 164 Cong. Rec. S7774 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 2018) (statement of Sen. Ben Cardin) 
(recounting Senator Cardin’s assertion that the First Step Act would “expedite[]” and “expand[] com-
passionate release”); 164 Cong. Rec. H10362 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 2018) (statement of Rep. Jerrold 
Nadler) (noting Rep. Nadler’s hope that the First Step act would “improv[e] application of compas-
sionate release”). 
 263 See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404 (1999) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[G]ive effect, 
if possible, to every clause and word of a statute.”); United States v. McCoy, 981 F.3d 271, 274 (4th 
Cir. 2020) (“By creating an avenue for defendants to seek relief directly from the courts, Congress 
effectuated an ‘incremental’ change, expanding the ‘discretion [of the courts] to consider leniency.’” 
(alteration in the original) (quoting Brooker, 976 F.3d at 230)). 
 264 See United States v. Marks, 455 F. Supp. 3d 17, 23 (W.D.N.Y. 2020) (noting that the BOP’s 
failure to bring compassionate release motions was a major motivator in Congress’s decision to 
amend the compassionate release process); DOJ OIG 2013 COMPASSIONATE RELEASE MEMO, supra 
note 16, at 11 (summarizing the BOP’s under-utilization of compassionate release, such that an aver-
age of twenty-four inmates were released annually over the five-year period analyzed). 
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section of the First Step Act is a clear indication of Congress’s intentions: “In-
creasing the Use and Transparency of Compassionate Release.”265 
Beyond titles, holistic statutory interpretation of the First Step Act weighs 
in favor of a Brooker reading as well.266 In 2019, the U.S. District Court for the 
Southern District of Texas in United States v. Cantu held that the Guidelines 
Manual did not apply to defendant-initiated compassionate release motions.267 
In its thorough analysis of the new compassionate release statute—one of the 
first such judicial analyses undertaken—the Cantu court noted that it was illog-
ical to require the BOP to make decisions on a defendant’s motion for compas-
sionate release under the First Step Act regime, which was specifically enacted 
to circumvent the BOP.268 The dissent in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit’s 2020 case United States v. Bryant followed the same line of 
thinking.269 Allowing the BOP to block defendant-filed compassionate release 
motions gives the BOP power that rightfully belongs to the Sentencing Com-
mission.270 Therefore, considering titles and practical application, the new stat-
utory regime eclipses the pre-First Step Act system, and courts should priori-
tize the effectuation of that new regime.271 
                                                                                                                           
 265 Formerly Incarcerated Reenter Society Transformed Safely Transitioning Every Person (First 
Step) Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 603(b), 132 Stat. 5194, 5239 (codified in scattered sections 
of 18 and 34 U.S.C.). Scrutinizing titles of statutes, which legislatures consider carefully before adopt-
ing, is a crucial step of statutory interpretation. See Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Balt. & Ohio 
R.R., 331 U.S. 519, 528–29 (1947) (discussing the use of titles in statutory interpretation and noting 
that titles of legislation can “shed light on some ambiguous word or phrase”). 
 266 See United States v. Cantu, 423 F. Supp. 3d 345, 350–52 (S.D. Tex. 2019) (applying princi-
ples of statutory interpretation to compassionate release under the First Step Act and supporting the 
Brooker principles of expanded judicial discretion). 
 267 See id. at 350 (interpreting the First Step Act as Congress’s manifest intent to increase the use 
of compassionate release). Although the Cantu court is not binding authority on any other court, the 
appellate courts discussed in this Note have adopted similar analyses. See United States v. Aruda, 993 
F.3d 797, 801–02 (9th Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (undertaking a similar statutory analysis); United States 
v. Brooker, 976 F.3d 228, 234 (2d Cir. 2020) (same). 
 268 See Cantu, 423 F. Supp. 3d at 351 (“[I]f the Director of the BOP were still the sole determiner 
of what constitutes an extraordinary and compelling reason, the amendment’s allowance of defend-
ants’ own § 3582(c)(1)(A) motions for reduction of sentence would be to no avail.”). 
 269 See United States v. Bryant, 996 F.3d 1243, 1272 (11th Cir. 2021) (Martin, J., dissenting) 
(positing that continued application of the out-of-date Guidelines Manual to compassionate release 
improperly gives BOP discretion over defendant-filed motions, and that the statutory changes to com-
passionate release stemmed from the BOP’s mishandling of the compassionate release program). 
 270 See id. (“But now, reading the Application Note in line with the majority’s interpretation, BOP 
is suddenly empowered to significantly restrain the universe of available ‘other reasons’ for defend-
ants seeking compassionate release on their own behalf.” (emphasis omitted)); United States v. Jones, 
980 F.3d 1098, 1110 (6th Cir. 2020), abrogated by United States v. Navarro, 986 F.3d 668 (6th Cir. 
2021) (“It would make little sense for the courts to operate as if the BOP remains the sole gatekeeper 
of compassionate release, which would reflect a bygone era that Congress intentionally amended in 
the First Step Act.”). 
 271 See Cantu, 423 F. Supp. 3d at 350 (citing ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING 
LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 327 (2012)) (stating that newer statutes take prece-
dence over older ones). 
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Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit’s articulation of the minority position on 
the appropriate reading of the compassionate release statute in Bryant is undu-
ly rigid and over-exacting.272 By hinging its interpretation on the dictionary 
definition of “applicable,” the Eleventh Circuit attempts to retrofit out-of-date 
guidance into an incompatible statutory framework.273 Furthermore, the Elev-
enth Circuit incorrectly assumed that because the out-of-date Guidelines Man-
ual is capable of being applied after the First Step Act, it must be applied.274 As 
a practical matter, the out-of-date Guidelines Manual can be a useful reference 
point for courts deciding compassionate release motions, as many courts have 
acknowledged, but mere usefulness does not require strict application.275 
Instead, district courts should rely on their discretion under the First Step 
Act to determine if and when a defendant has proffered an “extraordinary and 
compelling reason[]” warranting compassionate release.276 Doing so will best 
effectuate Congress’s intent of increasing the use of compassionate release and 
reducing the enormous federal prison population.277 Exercising this discretion 
                                                                                                                           
 272 See Bryant, 996 F.3d at 1259 (focusing on the dictionary definition of the word “applicable” in 
order to determine that the Guidelines Manual is still binding on judges considering whether to grant 
compassionate release); Brooker, 976 F.3d at 234 (noting congressional intent to increase the use of 
compassionate release given that it was severely underutilized prior to the enactment of the First Step 
Act at the end of 2020).  
 273 See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (setting forth the statutory framework for compassionate re-
lease in which motions may be brought by either the BOP Director or by the defendant directly); Bry-
ant, 996 F.3d at 1259 (holding that the compassionate release criteria in Guidelines Manual apply to 
motions brough by inmates despite conflicting language in compassionate release statute); 2018 
GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 11, § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1 (providing criteria for compassionate release 
and exclusively referring to motions brought by the BOP Director). 
 274 See Bryant, 996 F.3d at 1259 (holding the Guidelines Manual continues to provide binding 
guidance); United States v. Long, 997 F.3d 342, 358 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (criticizing the Eleventh Cir-
cuit’s approach as out of step with statutory intent because it empowers the BOP to improperly exer-
cise influence over the compassionate release process). 
 275 See United States v. McCoy, 981 F.3d 271, 277–78 (4th Cir. 2020) (noting that the compas-
sionate release criteria in the Guidelines Manual “remained informative” even if they are not compati-
ble with the current statutory regime); United States v. Lisi, 440 F. Supp. 3d 246, 252 (S.D.N.Y. 
2020) (considering the “animating principle” of releasing defendants to care for loved ones behind 
compassionate release for family circumstances in deciding whether to grant compassionate release 
for a reason that is similar to, but not exactly alike, the family circumstances in the Guidelines Manu-
al). 
 276 See Formerly Incarcerated Reenter Society Transformed Safely Transitioning Every Person 
(First Step) Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 603(b), 132 Stat. 5194, 5239 (codified in scattered 
sections of 18 and 34 U.S.C.) (amending the federal compassionate release process to empower courts 
with more authority to decide compassionate release motions); Brooker, 976 F.3d at 236 (holding that 
the previously binding Sentencing Commission guidance is no longer binding following the new 
statutory framework for compassionate release); 2018 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 11, § 1B1.13 
cmt. n.4 (commenting that courts are in the best position to determine whether compassionate release 
is appropriate). 
 277 See First Step Act § 603(b) (entitling the relevant portion of the Act “Increasing the Use and 
Transparency of Compassionate Release”); JAMES, THE FIRST STEP ACT, supra note 119, at 1 (identi-
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also captures the spirit of the catch-all provision in the Guidelines Manual.278 It 
would be nearly impossible for the Sentencing Commission to provide an ex-
haustive list of each and every circumstance constituting an “extraordinary and 
compelling reason[]” meriting release, which was why Congress created the 
catch-all provision in the first place.279 Further, the historic failure of the BOP 
Director to use his or her discretion does not mean the authority to exercise 
discretion is forfeited.280 
Although the First Step Act grants district courts significant authority on 
compassionate release matters, Congress certainly did not intend to let the ju-
diciary make decisions on a whim.281 The minority camp raises concerns about 
unchecked judicial decision-making, but these concerns are not necessarily 
well founded.282 District judges, unlike the BOP Director, are subject to rever-
sal by circuit courts, an outcome most district courts seek to avoid.283 Further, 
district courts have an obligation to explain their reasons for granting or deny-
ing compassionate release.284 Circuit courts have made clear their willingness 
to reverse a district court’s decision should abuse of discretion occur.285 In all 
                                                                                                                           
fying Congress’s goal of using the First Step Act to address mass incarceration and an overlarge fed-
eral prison population). 
 278 See 2018 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 11, § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1 (providing specific scenari-
os in which to grant compassionate release, but also reserving the capacity to exercise discretion in 
other extraordinary circumstances beside those specifically written out). 
 279 See id. § 1B1.13(1)(A) & cmt. n.4 (noting that “court[s are] . . . in a unique position to deter-
mine whether the circumstances warrant a reduction”); see also United States v. McCoy, 981 F.3d 
271, 288 (4th Cir. 2020) (concluding that the First Step Act conferred compassionate release decision-
making authority to district courts). 
 280 See United States v. Marks, 455 F. Supp. 3d 17, 23 (W.D.N.Y. 2020) (commenting that Con-
gress granted courts the authority to decide compassionate release motions with the intention that 
courts assess each individual case on its merits utilizing the court’s reasonable discretion). 
 281 See United States v. Jones, 980 F.3d 1098, 1112–14 (6th Cir. 2020), abrogated by United 
States v. Navarro, 986 F.3d 668 (6th Cir. 2021) (noting that the constraints in the compassionate re-
lease statute, as well as the court’s obligation to explain its decisions and the possibility of being over-
turned on appeal help ensure that district courts exercise discretion appropriately). 
 282 See id. (observing that compassionate release decisions can be reversed on appeal); United 
States v. Lynn, No. 89-0072, 2019 WL 3805349, at *3 (S.D. Ala. Aug. 13, 2019), appeal dismissed, 
No. 19-13239-F, 2019 WL 6273393 (11th Cir. Oct. 8, 2019) (indicating concern that sentencing 
courts will wield unchecked decision-making power to legislate from the bench). 
 283 See United States v. Gunn, 980 F.3d 1178, 1181 (7th Cir. 2020) (holding that district court 
compassionate release decisions are reviewable for error and can be reversed by the circuit court). 
 284 See Jones, 980 F.3d at 1112–14 (“District judges maintain an ‘obligation to provide reasons’ 
in . . . sentencing-modification decisions . . . .”); see also Chavez-Meza v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 
1959, 1963 (2018) (requiring district courts to adequately explain sentencing modification decisions); 
Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 572 U.S. 559, 563 n.2 (2014) (holding that appel-
late courts can correct legal or factual errors made by district courts); Martin v. Franklin Cap. Corp., 
546 U.S. 132, 139 (2005) (“Discretion is not whim . . . .”). 
 285 See Highmark, 572 U.S. at 563 n.2 (discussing the abuse of discretion standard in the context 
of criminal proceedings and noting that discretion is not entirely unlimited); Jones, 980 F.3d at 1112–
14 (emphasizing the district court’s obligation to explain its rationale for granting compassionate 
release); Gunn, 980 F.3d at 1181 (noting that district courts deciding compassionate release motions 
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respects, the reviewability of compassionate release decisions under the First 
Step Act is a marked improvement over the unreviewable “black box,” deci-
sion-making of the historic parole boards and the BOP.286 
Finally, the presence of an “extraordinary and compelling reason[]” does 
not make compassionate release a foregone conclusion.287 The compassionate 
release statute requires an analysis of the § 3553(a) factors in addition to a re-
view of the defendant’s claimed “extraordinary and compelling” circumstanc-
es.288 Furthermore, district judges are free to deny motions for compassionate 
release even if an “extraordinary and compelling” reason is present, and many 
have done so.289 Judicial interpretation, however, will only go so far without 
statutory or administrative intervention.290 
B. Future Action by the Sentencing Commission Should Allow District 
Judges Wide Discretion Over Compassionate Release Decisions 
If federal courts unanimously adopt the majority position, or if the Su-
preme Court endorses a position, then the issue of implementing compassion-
ate release under the First Step Act would be solved.291 The former is unlikely 
                                                                                                                           
are subject to “deferential appellate review” and making clear appellate courts’ willingness to reverse 
decisions if appropriate). 
 286 Compare Gunn, 980 F.3d at 1181 (holding that district court decisions on compassionate re-
lease are reviewable), with Crowe v. United States, 430 F. App’x 484, 485 (6th Cir. 2011) (per curi-
am) (holding that the BOP Director’s failure to bring a compassionate release motion is not reviewa-
ble), and Zannino v. Arnold, 531 F.2d 687, 690 (3d Cir. 1976) (finding the judiciary has limited dis-
cretion to review parole board decisions). 
 287 See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (listing the presence of “extraordinary and compelling reasons” 
as one of the necessary requirements to grant a motion for compassionate release alongside an analy-
sis of the § 3553(a) sentencing factors). 
 288 See id. (requiring that courts consider the § 3553(a) factors before granting a sentence reduc-
tion); United States v. Chambliss, 948 F.3d 691, 693–94 (5th Cir. 2020) (denying compassionate re-
lease based on the § 3553(a) factors despite the presence of “an extraordinary and compelling rea-
son”); 2018 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 11, § 1B1.13 (noting that compassionate release deci-
sions require courts to consider the § 3553(a) factors). 
 289 See, e.g., United States v. Kibble, 992 F.3d 326, 331–32 (4th Cir. 2021) (denying a motion for 
compassionate release because release was not warranted based on the need to deter criminal conduct 
similar to the defendant’s, and the need for the defendant’s sentence to be commensurate to his crime, 
which are two of the § 3553(a) factors); United States v. Allen, 819 F. App’x 418, 419 (6th Cir. 2020) 
(holding that the seriousness of the defendant’s firearms, drug trafficking, and obstruction of justice 
charges warranted denial of compassionate release despite the defendant’s major susceptibility to 
COVID); Chambliss, 948 F.3d at 693–94 (denying a terminally ill defendant’s motion for compas-
sionate release due to the severity of the defendant’s crime and the need to deter similar conduct). 
 290 See United States v. Long, 997 F.3d 342, 355 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (despairing over the lack of a 
Sentencing Commission policy statement applicable to the First Step Act and the circuit split regard-
ing the interpretation of the First Step Act’s amendments to compassionate release). 
 291 See Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 428 (2011) (discussing how one dis-
trict court’s decision can inform, but not bind, another district court, or even other judges on the same 
court); United States v. Lopez-Velasquez, 526 F.3d 804, 808 n.1 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (noting 
that Supreme Court precedent binds the decisions of lower courts). 
2510 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 62:2463 
to happen, but the latter is a long and arduous process.292 In all likelihood, only 
Congress or the Sentencing Commission can permanently resolve this con-
flict.293 No matter which body steps up first, it is important that they both take 
heed of the majority position.294 
Once the Guidelines Manual is updated to be consistent with the First 
Step Act, it will once again become fully binding on district courts.295 When 
the Sentencing Commission does promulgate new Guidelines, it should, in 
lockstep with Congress’s intent to expand compassionate release, accept the 
Brooker rationale, preserving the ability of district courts to exercise wide dis-
cretion over compassionate release motions.296 Admittedly, providing specific 
categories of “extraordinary and compelling reasons” may help guide judicial 
decision-making, but creating exhaustive and binding categories is not neces-
sary.297 To that end, the Sentencing Commission ought to make the adjust-
ments to the existing “extraordinary and compelling reasons” presently out-
lined in the Guidelines Manual by broadening eligibility for compassionate 
                                                                                                                           
 292 Compare United States v. Brooker, 976 F.3d 228, 234 (2d Cir. 2020) (holding that the Guide-
lines Manual’s criteria for compassionate release are not applicable to defendant-initiated motions), 
with United States v. Bryant, 996 F.3d 1243, 1247 (11th Cir. 2021) (declining to agree with Brooker 
and establishing the opposite holding as law in the Eleventh Circuit). Currently, no appeals of com-
passionate release decisions are pending before the U.S. Supreme Court. See Chief Judge Colleen 
McMahon, Speech, (Re)views from the Bench: A Judicial Perspective on Second-Look Sentencing in 
the Federal System, 58 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1617, 1620 (2021) (noting that the Supreme Court has not 
yet “[gotten] its hands on the Brooker decision”). 
 293 See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (requiring that reductions in sentences be consistent with Sen-
tencing Commission policy statements); 28 U.S.C. § 994(t) (empowering the Sentencing Commission 
to issue policy statements as needed, especially in response to new legislation). 
 294 See United States v. Andrews, No. 20-2768, 2021 WL 3852617, at *3 (3d Cir. Aug. 30, 2021) 
(endorsing the view that the Guidelines Manual is no longer binding); Long, 997 F.3d at 355 (same); 
United States v. Aruda, 993 F.3d 797, 801–02 (9th Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (same); United States v. 
Shkambi, 993 F.3d 388, 393 (5th Cir. 2021) (same); United States v. McGee, 992 F.3d 1035, 1050 
(10th Cir. 2021) (same); United States v. McCoy, 981 F.3d 271, 280–82 (4th Cir. 2020) (same); Unit-
ed States v. Jones, 980 F.3d 1098, 1111 (6th Cir. 2020), abrogated by United States v. Navarro, 986 
F.3d 668 (6th Cir. 2021) (same); Gunn, 980 F.3d at 1180–81 (same); Brooker, 976 F.3d at 234 (same). 
 295 See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) (stating that decisions to grant compassionate release must comport 
with any applicable policy statements from the Sentencing Commission, including the Guidelines 
Manual); 2018 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 11, § 1B1.13 (echoing the statutory directive that 
compassionate release decisions must be compatible with Sentencing Commission guidance). 
 296 See Brooker, 976 F.3d at 234 (holding that district courts have broad discretion in determining 
what constitutes an “extraordinary and compelling” reason warranting compassionate release); JAMES, 
THE FIRST STEP ACT, supra note 119, at 1 (identifying the under-utilization of compassionate release 
as Congress’s motivation to amending the compassionate release system). 
 297 See McCoy, 981 F.3d at 277–78 (stating that the Guidelines criteria for compassionate release 
are “no longer binding” after the First Step Act, but given that they reflect the judgment and expertise 
of the Sentencing Commission, the Guidelines Manual “remained informative”). 
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release.298 These adjustments should reflect the emerging case law consensus 
among district courts.299 
Under the age-related umbrella of criteria, the Sentencing Commission 
should lower the age at which defendants become eligible for compassionate 
release.300 Expanded access would more faithfully effectuate congressional 
intent to increase the use of compassionate release and specifically target de-
fendants sentenced during the “tough on crime” era.301 Additionally, because 
older inmates require more expensive and complex care than younger inmates, 
lowering the age for compassionate release would reduce expenses for the fed-
eral government—especially the BOP and DOJ.302 
In the family circumstances category, the Sentencing Commission should 
consider inmates for compassionate release who are the sole living caregivers 
for other family members in addition to spouses and children.303 This category 
could be expanded to allow compassionate release for defendants who are the 
sole living caregivers for a parent, for example, as at least one federal district 
court has done.304 
                                                                                                                           
 298 See id. (noting that district courts can still refer to the Guidelines Manual to inform decisions 
on compassionate release); JAMES, THE FIRST STEP ACT, supra note 119, at 1 (revealing congression-
al intent to reduce federal prison population through the First Step Act). 
 299 See, e.g., United States v. Vigneau, 473 F. Supp. 3d 31, 36–39 (D.R.I. 2020) (granting a mo-
tion for compassionate release for an “extraordinary and compelling reason[]” not explicitly listed in 
Guidelines Manual); United States v. Beck, 425 F. Supp. 3d 573, 580–82 (M.D.N.C. 2019) (same). 
 300 See Williams, Statement Before U.S. Sentencing Commission, supra note 15, at 3 (arguing for 
the lowering of the compassionate release eligibility age because of the “accelerated aging” phenome-
non, the cost savings the government could realize by incarcerating fewer elderly people, and the 
almost nonexistent likelihood of elderly persons to reoffend once they are released from prison (em-
phasis omitted)). 
 301 See United States v. Cantu, 423 F. Supp. 3d 345, 350–52 (S.D. Tex. 2019) (applying princi-
ples of statutory interpretation to conclude that the First Step Act indicates congressional intent to 
reduce a massive prison population brought about by historically harsh criminal laws); JAMES, THE 
FEDERAL PRISON POPULATION, supra note 20, at 1 (discussing the use of compassionate release to 
help ameliorate mass incarceration by shortening sentences and providing a means for early release); 
JAMES, THE FIRST STEP ACT, supra note 119, at 1 (noting that the First Step Act is the result of exten-
sive congressional debate on how to address the massive federal prison population). 
 302 See DOJ OIG 2015 AGING INMATES MEMO, supra note 12, at 10–11 (enumerating the in-
creased costs associated with incarcerating elderly persons due to the need to provide complex medi-
cal care and supervision); DOJ OIG 2013 COMPASSIONATE RELEASE MEMO, supra note 16, at 11 
(identifying the potential cost savings to the federal government that could result from incarcerating 
fewer elderly persons in the realm of $30,000 per person); Williams, Statement Before U.S. Sentenc-
ing Commission, supra note 15, passim (providing additional medical evidence explaining the in-
creased costs associated with elderly inmates by analyzing the specific needs of elderly prisoners). 
 303 See 2018 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 11, § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1 (permitting compassionate 
release for defendants who are the only available caregiver for a child or spouse); United States v. 
Bucci, 409 F. Supp. 3d 1, 2 (D. Mass. 2019) (granting a compassionate release motion for a defendant 
who was the only capable caregiver for a parent, rather than a child or spouse, because the circum-
stances were similar enough to be “extraordinary and compelling”). 
 304 See Bucci, 409 F. Supp. 3d at 2 (“When a defendant is the ‘only available caregiver’ for an 
incapacitated parent (perhaps a more unique occurrence given that inmates may have siblings or other 
2512 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 62:2463 
For compassionate release related to medical circumstances, a number of 
adjustments would prove beneficial.305 For one, creating uniform criteria for 
qualifying medical conditions and embedding it into the Guidelines Manual 
and Program Statement would reduce disparate outcomes.306 The revised crite-
ria should also remove strict life expectancy requirements for defendants with 
terminal illnesses.307 This requirement is too restrictive and it fails to account 
for defendants diagnosed as terminally ill without a specific life expectancy.308 
Finally, the criteria should explicitly include progressive ailments, especially 
those that impair cognitive function, as compelling circumstances.309 
Even with expanded criteria, the Guidelines Manual could never capture 
every possible “extraordinary and compelling reason[]” for release.310 As many 
courts in the majority camp have pointed out, some reasons, such as massive 
sentencing reform, are “extraordinary and compelling” yet entirely unforesee-
able.311 Denying defendants a remedy based on a simple administrative techni-
                                                                                                                           
family members able to care for their parents), then, it is likewise an ‘extraordinary and compelling’ 
reason warranting compassionate release.”). 
 305 See Williams, Statement Before U.S. Sentencing Commission, supra note 15, at 15–16 (provid-
ing ten recommended changes to compassionate release criteria based on medical circumstances); 
Jalila Jefferson-Bullock, Are You (Still) My Great and Worthy Opponent?: Compassionate Release of 
Terminally Ill Offenders, 83 UMKC L. REV. 521, 563 (2015) (arguing that judges are capable of un-
derstanding medical circumstances such that they should play a larger role than the BOP in making 
medical compassionate release determinations). 
 306 See Williams, Statement Before U.S. Sentencing Commission, supra note 15, at 6–7 (propos-
ing that prison officials approach medical compassionate release by examining individualized progno-
ses, rather than creating strictly defined categories). 
 307 See id. at 7–8 (suggesting that eligibility for compassionate release for terminal illness should 
only require “a predictable end of life trajectory” rather than an exacting prognosis of an eighteen-
month life expectancy in order to expand eligibility for compassionate release); see also Jefferson-
Bullock, supra note 305, at 557 (commenting that prisons are ill-equipped to provide adequate end-of-
life care given competing security and containment concerns). 
 308 See Williams, Statement Before U.S. Sentencing Commission, supra note 15, at 8; Jefferson-
Bullock, supra note 305, at 559 (asserting that reforms to medical compassionate release will afford 
greater dignity to terminally ill persons). 
 309 See Williams, Statement Before U.S. Sentencing Commission, supra note 15, at 8 (suggesting 
that defendants “who have severe dementia, are in a persistent vegetative state or who suffer from 
another form of severe cognitive impairment” and defendants with severe cognitive or functionally 
debilitating injuries should be eligible for compassionate release (emphasis omitted)). 
 310 See United States v. Brooker, 976 F.3d 228, 237 (2d Cir. 2020) (discussing the court’s role in 
assessing proffered “extraordinary and compelling reasons” and determining whether that reason 
warrants granting compassionate release); 2018 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 11, § 1B1.13 cmt. 
n.4 (“The court is in a unique position to determine whether the circumstances warrant a reduction 
. . . .”). 
 311 See United States v. Redd, 444 F. Supp. 3d 717, 727 (E.D. Va. 2020) (granting compassionate 
release to a defendant based on unforeseen changes in sentencing law); 2018 GUIDELINES MANUAL, 
supra note 11, § 1B1.13 cmt. n.2 (rejecting the notion that “an extraordinary and compassionate rea-
son” for compassionate release must also be unforeseeable). But see 28 C.F.R. § 571.60 (2021) (im-
plying that the BOP Director may only bring motions for compassionate release on a defendant’s 
behalf when an “extraordinary and compelling” reason was not foreseeable at the time a sentence was 
imposed). 
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cality would be grossly out of step with congressional intent.312 The Sentenc-
ing Commission should, therefore, preserve the “catch-all provision” in any 
future Guidelines Manuals, as well as instruction that the specific criteria for 
compassionate release are not exhaustive.313 Leaving space for judicial discre-
tion, subject to appellate review, will enable district judges to meaningfully 
address issues such as sentencing inequity and changes in sentencing regimes 
as they arise.314 
Finally, at a macro level, the Sentencing Commission should consistently 
look to compassionate release case law to inform future revisions to the Guide-
lines Manual.315 The Sentencing Commission’s job is made significantly easier 
with this change, as it delegates the task of considering and explaining each 
case’s circumstances to district judges.316 That said, by continuously adjusting 
the Guidelines Manual to reflect the consensus of the district courts, the Sen-
tencing Commission can in turn guide the decisions of district judges to grant 
or deny compassionate release.317 
                                                                                                                           
 312 See United States v. Urkevich, No. 03CR37, 2019 WL 6037391, at *4 (D. Neb. Nov. 14, 
2019), appeal voluntarily dismissed, No. 20-1603, 2020 WL 5642024 (8th Cir. Apr. 1, 2020) (holding 
that a reduction in sentence was warranted by the “injustice of [a defendant] facing a term of incarcer-
ation forty years longer than Congress now deems warranted”). 
 313 See United States v. McCoy, 981 F.3d 271, 277–78 (4th Cir. 2020) (noting that the Guidelines, 
although no longer binding, are helpful as a reference); United States v. Maumau, No. 08-CR-00758-
11, 2020 WL 806121, at *2, 7 (D. Utah Feb. 18, 2020) (utilizing the “catch-all provision” to grant 
compassionate release for reasons not specifically listed in Guidelines Manual). 
 314 See, e.g., United States v. Vigneau, 473 F. Supp. 3d 31, 36–39 (D.R.I. 2020) (granting com-
passionate release on the grounds that a defendant should benefit from the Sentencing Guidelines no 
longer being mandatory); Maumau, 2020 WL 806121, at *7 (finding that more lenient modern sen-
tencing law is an “extraordinary and compelling reason[]” justifying compassionate release); JAMES, 
THE FIRST STEP ACT, supra note 119, at 1 (discussing Congress’s intent to use the First Step Act to 
reduce the massive federal prison population). 
 315 See, e.g., Vigneau, 473 F. Supp. 3d at 36–39 (providing examples of “extraordinary and com-
pelling reasons” not listed in Guidelines Manual based on criminal justice reform such as changes in 
sentencing law); United States v. Bucci, 409 F. Supp. 3d 1, 2 (D. Mass. 2019) (granting compassion-
ate release for an inmate who was the sole available caregiver for an ill mother, an “extraordinary and 
compelling reason[]” not specifically listed in Guidelines Manual’s family circumstances); United 
States v. Beck, 425 F. Supp. 3d 573, 580–82 (M.D.N.C. 2019) (finding a prison’s failure to provide 
adequate medical care constituted an “extraordinary and compelling reason” even though that exact 
reason was not listed in Guidelines Manual’s based on medical circumstances category). 
 316 See 28 U.S.C. § 994(t) (empowering the Sentencing Commission with wide latitude to write 
policy statements that set forth criteria for when it is and is not appropriate for a sentencing court to 
grant compassionate release); United States v. Jones, 980 F.3d 1098, 1112–14 (6th Cir. 2020), abro-
gated by United States v. Navarro, 986 F.3d 668 (6th Cir. 2021) (reiterating the district court’s obliga-
tion to explain why compassionate release should be granted or denied). 
 317 See United States v. Rodriguez, 451 F. Supp. 3d 392, 400 (E.D. Pa. 2020) (“[T]his policy 
statement remains informative in guiding [the court’s] determination.”). 
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CONCLUSION 
Compassionate release replaced the traditional mechanisms for reducing 
the sentences of persons incarcerated in the federal system. The mechanism 
was historically underutilized, prompting harsh criticism of federal criminal 
justice officials from the public and other government officials. The First Step 
Act directly addressed this problem by expanding access to compassionate re-
lease. It allowed defendants to petition their sentencing courts directly, reduced 
the gatekeeping role of the BOP, and allowed the courts to consider each 
unique circumstance individually. This statutory change, however, had the un-
intended consequence of making administrative guidance on compassionate 
release criteria inconsistent with the statute itself. To address this uncertainty, 
courts have exercised varying levels of discretion on motions for compassion-
ate release. Most federal courts have moved beyond the BOP’s guidance when 
considering defendant-initiated motions for compassionate release. A sizeable 
minority disagrees with this approach, concluding that the guidance remains 
binding and exhaustive in its explanations of what reasons warrant compas-
sionate release. The majority approach best effectuates Congress’s intent to 
keep sentencing power in the judiciary, and as such courts should continue to 
adopt that approach. Further, future administrative guidance should, in the spir-
it of the majority approach, allow courts to continue to exercise wide discretion 
in compassionate release decisions, subject to appellate review. 
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